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This thesis is an assessment of the viability and susta inab i I I ty of
the Mexican corporatist political system instituted in 1929. What is the
future of Mexican politics over the next 20 years? Since 1929, this
system of government has been the most stable in Latin America. There
have been no presidential assassinations, no military coups, and no early
departures from office: all the above being accomplished with a judicious
blend of repression and co-optation. However, there are signs that the
flexibility of this system Is no longer sufficient to maintain government
in its current form. Through a look at the causes of the 1911
revolution, the resulting political structure, the current problems,
and the attempts at reform, what becomes apparent is that some type of
change seems almost unavoidable. Just what this change might be, to
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I . INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an assessment of the viability and sustainabi I i ty of
the Mexican corporatist political system instituted in 1929. What is the
future of Mexican politics over the next 20 years? Since 1929, this
system of government has been the most stable in Latin America. There
have been no presidential assassinations, no military coups, and no early
departures from office: all the above being accomplished with a judicious
blend of repression and co-optation. However, there are signs that the
flexibility of this system Is no longer sufficient to maintain government
in its current form. Through a look at the causes of the 1911
revolution, the resulting political structure, the current problems,
and the attempts at reform, what becomes apparent is that some type of
change seems almost unavoidable. Just what this change might be, to
include the timing and form of .said change, is the focus of this thesis.
A. THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: ANTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH
The Mexican revolution did not begin as a spontaneous uprising of
campesinos against either a repressive authoritarian regime or the
regional caudillos and landowners who took advantage of these peasants;
it originated within the ruling elite. Even though hundreds of thousands
of workers and peasants eventually mobilized, most of the revolutionary
leadership came from middle and upper-class Mexicans with dreams still
unfulfilled after 35 years of increasingly heavy-handed rule by the aging
dictator, Porflrlo Diaz.
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1 . stabl I Ity of the Diaz Regime
The stability of the Diaz regime depended on agreements worked
out with the different power groups of the time; Diaz struck deals with
regional strongmen, the church, and foreign investors. The policies of
Diaz, positivism, liberalism, and social Darwinism, created in Mexico one
of the most significant economic growth rates in the world between 1890
and 1910. These policies also widened the gap between the haves and the
have-nots; one percent of the population owned 85 percent of the land.
By 1910, there were a number of different interest groups with their own
unique demands. Regional caudillos, the church, foreigners, Indians,
middle class, landowners, military, labor, and peasant groups all wanted
to partake of the fruits of Mexico's growth. Diaz did not feel it
necessary to cater to the majority of these groups, especially the middle
class, and this ultimately resulted in his downfall.
The attitudes and policies of any regime are shaped by three
elements: the ruling, accepting, and opposition groups (Chalmers, 1986,
394). The ruling group includes those currently in power. The opposition
groups include those who would change the current policy direction. But
perhaps the most important element shaping current government actions is
the accepting groups. This body supports the ruling elites because of
derived benefits or lack of a better choice. Often consisting
principally of the middle class, it Includes professionals, managers, and
otherwise highly skilled workers. To remain in control, political elites
must satisfy the wants of this group. Diaz did not cater to this group
and thus unfulfilled desires of the middle class fueled the revolution.
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2. L Iberal Ism and the New E I I te
This middle class of the Diaz regime saw its opportunities for
future economic and political power taken away by the closed group of
advisors and friends surrounding the president. A revolutionary core of
middle and upper class committed themselves to a liberalization of the
political system with the aim of creating new opportunities within the
existing dynamic, free market economy. This reformist elite did not want
to abolish the established economic or political system, but rather make
it work for them instead of foreign entrepreneurs encouraged to Invest
during the Diaz regime. (Cornelius and Craig, 1984, pp. 416-417)
Heavily controlled previously, in 1908 Diaz told a U.S.
Journalist, John Creelman, that opposition groups would now be tolerated
and that he would be stepping down at the end of his term in 1910.
No matter what my friends and supporters say, I retire when my
presidential term of office ends, and I shall not serve again. I shal'
be eighty years old then. I have waited patiently for the day when the
people of the Mexican Republic should be prepared to choose and change
their government at every election without danger of armed revolution
and without injury to the national credit or interference with the
national progress. I believe that day has come. I welcome an
opposition party in the Mexican Republic.
(Meyer and Sherman, 1987. pp. 491-492)
However it became apparent Diaz was only trying to appease Washington and
tell political leaders in the United States what they wanted to hear.
When the aging dictator decided to remain in office after the 1910
elections, elements of the middle class reacted.
Francisco I. Madero, wealthy and Idealistic, proposed a change In
leadership and offered himself as a candidate for the leadership of
Mexico. In April, 1910, the Ant i-Reeleccionista Party nominated Madero
as Its presidential candidate-, his popularity was so great that Diaz had
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him put in Jail until after the elections in July of that year. Protests
by Madero in November, 1910, fomented unrest In the countryside and
caudillos like Pascual Orozco and Francisco (Pancho) Villa took over
border towns and fought with government forces. With federal troops
defecting to the rebel cause and opposition groups becoming active in the
capital and surrounding towns, Diaz stepped down and Madero grabbed hold
of the reins of government. The revolution had begun; the Mexican
political system was to undergo dramatic and radical change.
In order to institutionalize the revolutionary ideology of the
early 1900's, the new ruling elite weaved these ideals into a 1917
revision of the 1857 constitution. During ratification of this new
constitution, convention delegates favoring a strong central government
prevailed over those who were afraid a concentration of power would
produce another Diaz-type government. The former argued centralism was
necessary to allow the government sufficient control over economic policy
to enable it to compete effectively with the church and private banks.
Since the constitution of 1917, the concentration of decision-making
power at the federal level has been strengthened; the resulting system
ensured Mexico's political stability for 60 years. (Cornelius and Craig,
1984, 425)
3. Or Iglns of the One-Party System
The revolution did not eliminate the large landowners of the
Porfiriato; they still controlled extensive tracts of property and other
forms of wealth in many parts of the country. This helps to explain why,
despite the massive bloodletting and destruction of the political and
military institutions of the Porfirian regime, the Mexican revolution
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brought about so little in the way of structural reforms that
redistributed wealth and restructured society.
The Mexican Revolution did not produce (1) a system derived from
the restructuring of class relations, (2) the destruction of the class
system, or (3) the development of a new belief system. It was a
reorganization of elite Interests; this elite accepted the state as both
the catalyst for profit generation and the developer and guarantor of an
infrastructure for the control of society. The ruling elites tried to
legitimize this new political model on the basis of a loosely connected
set of goals or symbols, ostensibly born during the revolution, none of
which conflicted with the essential interests of elites, in particular,
the hegemony of the dominant class. (Gentleman, 1987, 4) The varying
Interests among the victors of the 1910 revolution produced 13 years of
violence. During the 1920s, the central government under presidents
Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Calles set about to eliminate the most
powerful and Independent-minded regional caudlllos by co-opting local
leaders within the caudillos' territory. These local political power
brokers became, in effect, extensions of the regime, supporting Its
policies and maintaining control over the population. By the end of the
1920s, regional caudillos with genuine popular followings like Emiliano
Zapata, who recruited Indian laborers from the sugar plantations in
southern Mexico and Pancho Villa, who defied authority in the Chihuahua
countryside, had been assassinated; control had been seized by a post-
revolutionary elite whose goal was demobilization of the masses and
establishment of the primacy of the central government. Before this
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demobilization could take place, General Alvaro Obregon, Mexico's
president-elect, was assassinated in 1928.
The assassination of Obregon disrupted the presidential
succession and raised the threat of all-out civil war among the
"revolutionaries" who had produced the constitution of 1917 with Its
progressive goals designed to lead the country from economic stagnation,
backwardness, and political instability. The intense hostility between
the Agrarista Party, principal supporters of Obregon, and the groups
supporting the outgoing President, Plutarco Calles, made it necessary to
find some new solution. Calles introduced the idea of an Inclusive
single party incorporating all revolutionary groups and providing
established procedures so that all factions could work together to make
decisions Involving succession to office at all levels (Padgett, 1966,
48).
Calles established the Partido Nacional Revoluc ionar io (PNR) and
proclaimed that the military, liberals and conservatives, intellectuals,
peasant and elite alike of the other 400 political groups functioning at
that time in Mexico were instantly members of various Interest factions
in this all-powerful party. Between 1934 and 1940, President Lazaro
Cardenas formalized the different sectors of the party by forming the
Confederaclon Nacional Campesina (CNC), and the Confederacion de
Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM) . Cardenas also instituted formation of a
white-collar sector, the Confederaclon Nacional de Organizaciones
Populares (CNOP). The military, then a powerful interest group, was
allowed to participate in government planning and decisions. By 1938,
the one-party system had four groups: labor, peasant, white-collar, and
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military. Cardenas changed the party name to the Partldo Revoluc ionar io
Mexlcano (PRM) in 1938 and President Miguel Aleman changed it to the
Partido Revoluc ionar Io Inst i tuciona I (PRI) in 1946. After 1946, while
the power of the other sectors remained strong, the military group
gradually began to weaken. Along with a reduction in the military
budget, the 1940's and 1950's brought a gradual reduction in the
influence of the armed forces. Once almost omnipotent, the military
general in Mexico increasingly played a minor role In relation to, and in
response to, the political arena (Riding, 1984, pp. 73-78). This
lessening of importance obviated the need for a special sector to
represent the interests of the men in uniform. Because of this, the
military sector disappeared altogether.
Coinciding with the development of a strong one-party system was
a strong and vigorous economy. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
Mexico was expanding at one of the fastest rates in the world; the
average growth rate was six percent between the 1940's and mid 1960's.
(Levy, 1983, 127) The regime fueled expansion by channeling profits to
business elites through wage controls and price increases within an
economic strategy called Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI).
4. Import Subst I tut Ing Industr la I Izat Ion
ISI as a strategy aims to reduce or eliminate imports of a
certain commodity, replacing them by domestic production. It places
Increasing emphasis, through investment, on industry: often to the
neglect of agriculture. Public sector investment In industry skyrocketed
between 1941 and 1980 in Mexico while the percentage earmarked for
agriculture was only modestly improved. This is reflected in a drop in
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agriculture's contribution to total production from 21 percent to 11
percent. Industry's contribution jumped from 25 percent to 34 percent
(Levy, 1983, 129).
TABLE 1: RATES OF GROWTH 1940-1975 GNP , AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY
Per iod Agr icul ture Industry GDP
1940-1950 8.2 n/a n/a
1950-1960 4.3 6.5 5.7
1960-1965 4.6 8.6 7.1
1965-1970 2.7 8.9 6.9
1970-1974 1 .7 6.3 5.5
(Graham, 1984, pp. 19-37)
Additionally, only 39 percent of the work force was employed in
agriculture in 1970 as compared to 67 percent in 1940.






The phenomenal growth rate and minimal inflation rate (an average
of less than six percent between 1950-1975) generated by ISI allowed the
state, until the early 1980s, to easily finance the co-opt ive nature of
the Mexican system. The co-optlve and authoritarian pattern of politics,
coupled with the state's ability to provide development financing,
without the imposition of harsh austerity programs, enabled the regime
for many decades to limit damaging conflict In the society. The regime
seldom needed to resort to repressive measures as interest groups could
be bribed or co-opted with readily available monies. This heavy
-8-
co-optation and light repression prevented the emergence of a national,
significant, and organized political challenge. (Gentleman, 1987, 42)
B. FINAL THOUGHTS: THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
Mexico before the revolution was the domain of one man, Porfirlo
Diaz. He energized a backwards country and produced one of the fastest
growing economies of its time. He also increased the already large
disparity between the rich and the poor, promoting a very limited and
exclusionary socio-economic system. Those middle and upper classes
outside of this system revolted in an effort to "share the spoils."
Mexico after the revolution of 1910 was a loose coalition of
political elites all of whom wanted to reap the benefits of economic
growth and political favors. This coalition did not want to change the
traditional formula for the distribution of wealth; they merely wanted to
be Included. In order to preserve this unstable coalition, a one-party
government was created that embodied all of society within different and
unique political sectors. The following section describes the modern
Mexican state and this one-party system as It has evolved since 1928.
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I I . THE MODERN MEXICAN REGIME
A. CORPORATISM IN MEXICO
Corporatism is a method of governing which restricts or eliminates
pluralistic competition: private interest groups competing for influence
over the government and the policies of the nation. In a corporatist
society, government controls the public sector; society tries to
influence government decisions through various corporatist spokesmen who
represent large sectors of the population. Corporatism can be a true
collaboration between private interest groups and a governing body really
Interested in listening to opposing viewpoints. Or it can function under
strict government control with the corporatist sectors doing little more
than relaying orders of the government to the public sector. (Wynla,
1984, 99) Mexico operates somewhere in between with a system of populist
corporat ism.
Populist corporatism implies controlled political mobilization in
order to avoid spontaneous uprisings from various class groups. Populist
corporatism enfolds the most influential of these class groups within the
state apparatus, controlling and de-radicalizing their demands. This
demobilization process In the Mexican political system allowed a
sophisticated use of the bargaining process within the limits prescribed
by the state. This process is an alternative to the Indiscriminate use
of repressive measures. If groups were not co-opted, they would have to
be suppressed; political organizations within the various corporatist
sectors in Mexico act as buffers to this repression. Populist Ideology
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within a corporatist structure prevents the development in Mexico of real
and representative political organizations. Those who resist the system
are at risk because of its strength. The combination of authoritarian
control and a populist ideology has been effective in neutralizing worker
demands, particularly those calling for a redistribution of wealth. Some
redistribution is necessary in a regime using co-optation as a political
tool, but the distinctive characteristic of Mexico's policies is how this
allocation is Implemented. Most often, benefit allocation is initiated
from the top; it is not in reaction to demands from below. Demands
coming from below are rarely implemented; that would imply real
mobilization. Mexico's control of its economic expansion closely
followed the corporatist organization of politics. Economic growth
depended on co-optation and suppression of the labor unions-, this control
has been achieved by the tenets of populist corporatism. The
distribution of wealth was a function of initiatives from the top levels
of government used to defuse popular pressures. In a corporatist system,
as economic problems arise and co-optation cannot be accomplished through
distribution of tangible benefits, the greater is the likelihood of
populist rhetoric to diffuse mobilization. (Reyna, 1977, pp. 161-162)
The Mexican regime both operat ional izes its corporatist ideology and
implements its systems of co-optation and repression through the PR I.
The PR I divides itself into the aforementioned peasant, labor, and
popular sectors. The popular sector of modern Mexico now represents most
government employees, small merchants, private landowners, and low-income
urban neighborhood groups. Each sector Is dominated by the groups
instituted and sanctioned during the Cardenas presidency: the CTM In the
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labor sector; the CNC in the peasant sector; and the CNOP in the popular
sector
.
Essential for the stability of the political structure is a low level
of real or valid political participation. The system relies on the
apathy of large sectors of the population, especially landless peasants
and laborers. The chief benefit of this apathy for the ruling elite is
the need to cope with only infrequent demands from most sectors of
society, permitting more time to ensure competing elite interests are
satisfied. Between 50 and 70 percent of today's Mexicans are effectively
barred, through the corporatist form of Interest representation, from
making any type of demand upon the political system. A key to the
maintenance of the Mexican system has been the ability to easily finance
the kinds of superficial reforms required to defuse the potential for
mass mobilization. (Gentleman, 1987, 6) Ostensibly, these reforms
further the goals of the revolution.
B. MODERN OPERATIONAL I ZAT ION OF THREE PILLARS OF REVOLUTION
The current Mexican regime claims multiple bases of legitimacy. The
revolution of 1910 produced three major themes: I ibera I ism , socia I
wel fare
,
and nat iona I ism ; all three are significant legitimating symbols.
Mexican liberalism is at once both familiar and foreign. While
resembling the American tradition in its physical setup, the Mexican
version is In fact strongly influenced by the European idea of a strong
state acting as the implementor of law within society. Social welfare
Implies economic growth, redistribution of wealth, and improved living
conditions. (Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 425) The overwhelming presence
-12-
of the United States requires special attention in building a national
awareness; this Is often operat iona I ized as anti-U.S. sentiments
(Bai ley, 1987, 64).
1 . Mex I co: L Iberal Ism?
Although clearly built along corporatist lines, Mexico considers
Itself a democracy. The state considers Itself to be the law-giving and
order-creating embodiment of an historic social struggle that saw
1,000,000 Mexicans killed over the period 1910-1929. This leads to a
particular view of its role in Mexican democracy, as expressed in party
statutes:
The function that corresponds historically to the PRI consists of
assuring the permanence of the nationalist revolutionary current in the
exercise of state power. [This will be accomplished] through the
cohesion of the fundamental forces of the people and the strengthening
of the bases of democratic support for the constitutional regime of
government. The party will strugg le . . . to maintain power to carry out
its ultimate consequences the historic project of the Mexican
Revolution, by means of the complete force of the essential principles
of democracy and social justice of revolutionary nationalism and the
Invigoration of the institutions sustained in such principles.
(Ba! ley, 1987, 64)
Another view of Mexican democracy by former president Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
says that
...the Important thing in a democracy is not so much the procedure
as the very essence, and the essence of democracy consists in that it
is the sum of the majority wills of the people that determines the
paths for government to follow In two respects: with regard to the
selection of men and with regard to decision making. (Bailey, 1987,
64)
In one sense Mexico is a democracy; It Is a procedural democracy.
The "trappings" of democracy are present: there are popular elections
among multiple candidates. However, the opposition serves as
legitimation for the PRI more than competition; they provide candidates
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for the various elections and show the world that the PR I is voted in
every term with a mandate from the people. Opposition parties also
provide an outlet for the protest vote: people who are so dissatisfied
with the government's performance that they can't bring themselves to
vote for PRI candidates. Opposition parties are an outlet for dissident
political leaders; they actually strengthen the regime by channeling
demands within the government-sanctioned arena of political competition.
But the substantive parts of democracy, free elections, more than
one candidate competing for office with a realistic chance of winning,
multiple viable political parties, and rotation of incumbents between
differing political views and parties, is absent. Substantive democracy
addresses the features of the electoral system itself. It provides for
the unrestricted participation of all the members of a society in the
election of government representatives in law-making processes and
positions of influence (Tagle, 1987, 153).
The contradiction between substantive and procedural democracy is
reconcilable in Mexico as long as the PRI persists in Its claim to pursue
the "perfection" of democracy. It is tolerable in practice as long as
the system demonstrates, to the masses, progress on nationalism and
social welfare projects. Business elites, by and large, are content as
long as there are large and continuous profits; the lower classes gain
some sense of satisfaction from the general image of progress. (Bailey,
1987, 65)
The main features of Mexican politics are limited mobilization;
restricted pluralism; competition for public office and benefits
restricted to those who support the system; centralized decision making
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by one leader or small group; and weak ideological constraints on public
policy making. The mouthpiece for the policy decisions of the regime is
the PR I
.
a. The PR I
The PRI, and therefore the regime, is usually centrist in its
domestic and foreign policies. That is, centrist within the plethora of
political parties in the country. The U.S. often considers Mexico's
policy Initiatives too far left of center. Although Mexico's rhetoric is
usually revolutionary and often radical, Its policies are not. Being the
party in power for as long as it has dictates that the PRI fill the
political center if for no other reason than to allow those who are more
conservative (the Partido de Accion Nacional, or PAN) to formulate policy
platforms and ideologies that are to the right of those of the PRI and
those who are more liberal (the PSUM and now the National Democratic
Front) to formulate platforms and ideologies to the left (Klesner, 1987,
101). The actual centralist policies negate some of the appeal of the
right while the leftist rhetoric draws support away from the left.
The PRI's strength is with the relatively backward, rural,
and agricultural peoples of Mexico: campesinos, ejidatarlos, and the
landless peasants. This suggests that the social classes that back the
PRI are those It can most completely manipulate through fear, violence,
or economic pressure. The PRI's strength In areas populated by this
rural lower-class has not weakened over time; If anything, it has
increased. (Klesner, 1987, 111)
The PRI and its electoral campaigns serve as a method for
distributing small-scale material benefits to Mexico's poor, thereby
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helping to increase voter turnout and build mass support for the system.
The sexennial campaigns for the presidency and the triennial campaigns
for congressional seats bring people in even the most isolated rural
villages and neglected urban slums into direct contact with PRI
candidates. Even though the candidates promises of help for the
community once he is elected may not be believed, a few concrete goods
and services can be obtained by the peasants during campaign rallies.
Medical and dental examinations are sometimes conducted, children and
pets are vaccinated, small campaign gifts like shopping bags and
notebooks for school children are distributed, and sewing machines and
other household appliances are raffled off; this gives the PRI an
advantage over the opposition parties, which usually have nothing to
distribute. Additionally, Mexico's official party has had the economic
power to distribute these benefits on a nationwide basis. At best, the
opposition works in regions of the country only. The PRI's success as a
vote-getting machine serves as one of the methods to legitimize its
continued hold on the presidency (Cornelius and Craig, 1984, pp. 439-
440).
b. Presidential Rule
The political system is commonly described as pres ident la I ly
centered highlighting the extraordinary powers of the Mexican president.
Ratification of the president's policy choices by both houses of Congress
has been virtually automatic since 1930. On any Issue having national
political significance, the federal Judiciary takes its cue from the
incumbent president or legislation enacted in his behalf. As with the
legislature and judiciary, the president is not limited by any type of
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rigid ideology. The ideals of the Revolution are no more than a loosely
connected set of goals or symbols: social justice, economic nationalism,
reduced influence of the church in public life, and freedom from self-
perpetuating dictatorial rule in the Porfirio Diaz style. These ideals
do not generate specific policies and therefore do not need to be result
oriented. This in combination with a lack of checks and balances usually
provided by a legislative and Judicial branch makes possible a flexible
style of leadership and ensures ultimate power and influence by the
president at all levels of government.
Most public officials serve at the pleasure of the President.
For municipal or state offices, the president can veto any nomination.
The selection of a successor to the president of the republic is a
mystery to all but the Mexican political elite, but all observers agree
that the incumbent plays a major role in the process; the current state
of political and economic affairs also affects the choice.
As Mexican presidents are so much a product of the system
over which they preside, it is often argued that policy shifts from one
administration to another are likely to be limited. Though dramatic
policy shifts by Incoming presidents are not likely, meaningful
"readjustments" of policy orientation and political style are both
feasible and necessary to maintain political stability. Swings in policy
have occurred from one sexenio to another on a rough kind of left-right,
progress-conservative continuum, since consolidation of the central
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(Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 430)
Figure 1: Ideological Slant of Mexican Sexenios
Although not restricted by the government structure, the
presidency does confront some real limitations. Mexico's participation
on the international stage imposes constraints in areas such as tourism,
trade, Investment, and even the vague "world opinion." Macroeconomic
policy is dictated by oil prices on the International market, Interest
rates of the creditor countries, and world economic trade cycles.
Business elites, both national and foreign, limit presidential behavior
because of the threat of capital flight: a significant problem in Mexico
since the early 1970s. The CTM, a pillar of the PR I and the Mexican
regime, must be negotiated with. Mexican workers are constantly called
upon to sacrifice increased wages and endure declining standards of
living in the name of economic growth or as a result of IMF-imposed
austerity measures. Journalism enjoys increasing freedom within the
country, although the custom of avoiding direct criticism of the
president still generally holds. Foreign media is more constraining
through the worldwide exposure It often affords.
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The deterioration of the image of the presidency due to the
turmoil of previous sexenios often restricts behavior of the current
president (Bailey, 1987, 68). In 1976, president Echeverria devalued the
peso over 40 percent causing heavy capital flight; in 1982, president
Port i I I o again devalued the peso by 70 percent and nationalized the
Mexican banking system. President de la Madrid also greatly devalued the
peso and has presided over a contraction In the economy. This puts
Carlos Salinas de Gortari at a disadvantage In dealing with business
leaders concerned with dwindling profits and labor leaders concerned with
the shrinking buying power of the peso. Mexico's form of "liberalism"
then, greatly affects the benefits and overall social welfare of the
society.
Although in theory similar to the United States, the three
branches of government In Mexico do not Impose restraints on each other.
The executive branch holds the vast majority of power and in reality
operates Independently. This Is not to say there are no restrictions
placed on the president. However, these limitations are imposed not by
internal factors but by external forces through participation in the
wor Id marketp lace.
2. Social Welfare
During the revolution of 1910 the ruling elite formally committed
themselves to Improving the lot of the masses through a reallocation of
wealth. One of the principal methods for this reallocation was the
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(Meyer and Sherman, 1987, 599)
The number of acres given to peasants reached its peak during the
Cardenas administration. After the Cardenas sexenio, land distribution
declined sharply, reaching pre-Carden ist levels.
Other improvements initiated In the early years after the Mexican
revolution included increased federal expenditures for education and the
strengthening of the labor unions. Increases in minimum wage, sports and
recreation programs, as well as health and sanitation projects were also
seen. (Meyer and Sherman, 1987, 598-603)
Although formally committed through Its constitution and the
above programs to the improvement of the common people, the masses in
Mexico benefitted little, actually taking a step backwards, during the
impressive growth Mexico experienced during the years after 1940. During
this period the wealth of middle and upper class Mexicans grew yet the
disparity In income between these groups and the masses was as large as
In 1910. The richest ten percent of Mexicans were 52 times richer than
the poorest ten percent. Additionally, the cost of living was
increasing. Inflation, 22 percent in 1974, rose to over 100 percent by
1982. As the consumer price index increased steadily, real wages
actual ly dropped.
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(Hellman, 1978, 104 and Alvarez, 1986, 49)
Social conditions never substantially Improved after 1940. The
majority of adults in the rural areas of Mexico remained illiterate; only
15 percent had even attended four years of primary schooling. Fifty
percent of the homes in the rural areas consist of only one room. As
late as 1979, only 28 percent of Mexicans in the rural areas had
electricity and less than 50 percent had safe drinking water. Parallel
statistics for the middle and upper class showed only a ten percent
illiteracy rate in adult males in Mexico City, 80 percent had
electricity, and 70 percent safe water. More information on the lot of
the rural masses follows In a 1970 table based on the Mexican census.
The rural conditions, although much better, point to the poverty
throughout the country.
-21-












Live in homes of only one room
Live In homes with electricity




Eat only tortillas (no bread)
Do not eat meat even once a week
Do not eat eggs even once a week
(Hel Iman, 1978, 107)
The Mexico of today is not much changed from the 1940 to mid-
1970s time frame. Only 60 percent of Mexicans today are receiving enough
food; most consume less than 2000 calories per day. Twenty percent of
the population eats no meat or eggs and 40 percent drink no milk. In
some portions of the country over 80 percent do without these staples.
Thirty percent receive no health care. In Chiapas in 1983, 2.5 million
people were served by only 250 hospital beds and 521 doctors. Forty
percent of the country is underemployed while the upper 30 percent of the
people control 73 percent of the income. Besides an emphasis on
accumulation over redistribution, massive population growth contributed
to the social ills of current-day Mexico. (Riding, 1984, pp. 316-317)
The population growth rate in 1940 was 1.1 percent but had jumped
to 3.5 percent by 1970. During this period the population Increased over
150 percent. Although the growth rate was 2.3 percent by 1984, down from
a high of 3.7 percent in 1977, the government struggled to provide
adequate health care for 40 million Mexicans born in the previous
20 years (Riding, 1984, pp. 316-334). The promises made by the
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ruling elite in 1910 that dealt with the elimination of social inequity
and social injustice have not yet come to fruition in 1988. Equally as
frustrating to the impoverished is the closeness of a country of great
wealth and opportunity.
3. Nat lona I Ism and the Unl ted States
Mexico and the United States share a border almost 2000 miles in
length. The United States is Mexico's largest trading partner while
Mexico is third on the list of major trading partners for the U.S. Over
12 million Mexicans live in the United States (Chavez, 1987, 12); 500,000
Americans live in Mexico and four million visit annually (Castaneda,
1986, 122). But further Investigation reveals a sometimes stormy
relationship. In 1821, the Spanish granted Moses Austin, an American,
the right to colonize one of the most northern portions of Mexico: Texas.
By 1835, the Americans numbered over 30,000 while Mexico could count only
7800 in Texas. Declaring their independence in that same year, Texans
fought bitter battles with Mexican troops to win their freedom; the most
famous of which was the battle at the Alamo. Although victorious in
that particular battle, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna Perez de Lebron was
captured by the Texans in 1836. During his imprisonment Santa Anna
signed two treaties; one promised cessation of hostilities while the
other granted Texas Its Independence. Another war In 1846, between the
U.S. and Mexico resulted in more sovereign Mexican land becoming the
property of the United States. (Meyer and Sherman, 1987, pp. 338-342)
Independent from 1836-1845, Texas was a target for U.S.
annexation in 1845. In 1845, Texas, In a declaration disputed by Mexico,
claimed parts of New Mexico and Colorado as well as what is today Texas
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territory. Additionally, the United States wanted the rest of New Mexico
and California. Mexicans, still stinging from the loss of Texas in 1836,
refused to discuss any terms or possible sale. Operating in disputed
territory on May 9, 1846, American general Zachary Taylor was attacked by
Mexican forces. The United States declared war on Mexico and defeated
them by 1848. In the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848,
Mexico ceded California, New Mexico, and the disputed parts of the Texas
territory to the U.S. In this one treaty, Mexico lost half of its
territory. Further alienating his countrymen, General Santa Anna sold
what Is now southern New Mexico and Arizona to the U.S. for $10 million
in the Gadsden Purchase of 1853. (Meyer and Sherman, 1987, 342-352)
It is clear then that since the beginning of the 19th century,
the Mexicans have often been in conflict with the United States. It is
also clear that Mexico lost much because of this conflict: almost half of
its land and perhaps much of the respect for Its northern neighbor.
These losses were not due to diplomatic maneuvering but simply the
overwhelming power of the United States, both militarily and
economically, vis-a-vis Mexico. Even with the passing of decades, the
relationship today is often still one of conflict and confrontation. A
contemporary comparison of military strengths, population, and economy of
the two countries again highlights a number of inequities.
The United States is far superior militarily to Mexico, has three
times the population, and 15 times the gross national product. Two-
thirds of Mexico's trade is with the U.S. while only three to six
percent of U.S. trade is with Mexico. Mexico depends primarily on the
United States' market for Its goods and United States' loans (through its
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control of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) to finance its
development. On a philosophical level, there are also differences; the
different cultures and value systems produce national interests not
always in agreement. Three areas producing much discussion and
disagreement between the two nations are emigration, narcotics
trafficking, and Mexico's foreign debt. The first two topics are
discussed in the following sections while foreign debt will be taken up
in part three of this thesis.
a. Immigration to the United States
Mexico's rapid population growth over the past 20 years, (in
excess of three percent per year) has resulted in the need to generate
800,000 new Jobs annually just to maintain a steady employment rate.
Currently, Mexico produces only 400,000 new Jobs per annum. Immigration
to the U.S. of under or unemployed workers acts as a pressure release
for the tensions and hardships of a struggling economy. The vast
majority of Immigrants are low-s<llled. As such, this puts little drain
on the productivity of the nation while reducing the dangers of
uncontrolled mobilization. Additionally, if one assumes the bulk of
migration is temporary and undocumented, Income earned is added to
Mexico's output, not that of the United States. (Gibson, 1985)
While Mexico would like to Increase the Immigration flow, the U.S., at
least through recent legislation, has shown a desire to slow and better
document the flow. This bill, discussed in the following paragraphs,
caused much debate In the U.S. Congress and highlighted two very
different opinions of Mexican immigration.
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First, immigration takes Jobs away from American workers and
overtaxes state and federal welfare services. In 1986 the U.S. passed
the Simpson-Rodino immigration bill which now limits migration from
Mexico. The law will crack down on illegals in the country by (1)
forcing employers to require documentation before hiring migrant workers,
(2) strengthening border patrol inspections, and (3) offering amnesty and
citizenship to workers who can prove residence in the U.S. before
January 1, 1982 (Armstrong, 1988). This last provision will guarantee
that the income of the now legal workers will be added to the GNP of the
United States, not Mexico. This legislation has the effect of closing
the pressure valve Mexico counts on to help relieve stress In the
country.
The second view of immigration emphasizes the positive side.
Mexicans do not take jobs from American workers because they labor in
positions that U.S. blue-collar workers do not want. If they do take
some jobs away, the displaced U.S. worker is retrained and gains
valuable new skills. Additionally, this cheap Mexican labor keeps the
cost of goods down and helps the United States compete with low wages
paid in the Far East. This more positive view of Mexican Immigration Is
a minority opinion at the present time. Another issue between the two
countries generating differing viewpoints and heated debate is the flow
of i I legal narcot ics.
b. Narcot Ics Trafficking
Drug trafficking didn't become a highly publicized Issue
between the two countries until February, 1985 when a U.S. drug
enforcement agent, Enrique Camarena, was murdered (Smith, 1987, 130).
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This has led to many of the allegations about corruption and cover-up in
drug enforcement operations in Mexico. Who is responsible for the 15
million marijuana users and the one-half million heroin users in the
United States? Who is to blame for the ten million pounds of marijuana
and the large quantities of heroin making their way to the U.S. every
year? Who causes billions of dollars each year to be spent on Increased
health care costs, lost productivity, and related crime and violence?
(UN Chronicle, 1987, xi) The answer depends on who you talk to.
The U.S. places primary responsibility on Mexico, citing five
reasons.
1. Failure to promote agricultural alternatives.
2. Tacit encouragement of drug trafficking.
3. Inadequate drug campaigns.
4. Non-confrontation of local guerrillas.
5. Failure to cooperate with U.S. officials. (Levy, 1983, 196)
In April, 1988, the Senate voted 63-27 to impose sanctions against Mexico
for a lack of effort in curbing drug trafficking. Under this
"decertification", aid would be cut by 50 percent; more seriously, the
same vote would curtail loans available through the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank. Although never decertified under the
Reagan administration, republican senator Alfonse D'Amato from New York
called Mexico "America's No.1 drug dealer." (Greenberger , 1988, 50)
From a Mexican viewpoint, the major responsibility for the
drug problem should be shouldered by the United States. If the market
for drugs dries up, then so will production. Mexico points to the large
number of people convicted of drug crimes in the United States, using
this as their argument that demand is high. An advisor to Mexican
president Miguel de la Madrid said of the sanctions voted on by Congress,
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If the US President would be required to certify local, state, and
federal efforts the way he Is required to certify Mexico, those
entities wouldn't be certified at all. (Greenberger , 1988, 50)
In the same breath, they point to the help given In
eradicating the growing of illegal drugs in their country. In the mid-
1970's, Operation Condor, a joint U.S. -Mexican effort was wiping out
marijuana fields and prosecuting drug traffickers. In September, 1986,
U.S. officials brought six Turbo Thrush aircraft to Mexico, combining
them with high-spraying capacity helicopters of the de la Madrid
government, and eradicated much of the fall poppy crop before it could be
harvested. But in their view the U.S. was still primarily responsible
for the drug problem because of the high demand. (Whitehead, 1986, 38)
C. FINAL THOUGHTS: THE MODERN MEXICAN REGIME
The phrase, "the more things change, the more they stay the same,"
aptly applies to Mexico in many ways. Since the days of the Porflriato,
the political system has been characterized by a strong and highly
centralized government. The revolution did not change this. It replaced
one ruling elite with another. Since the days of the Porflriato,
Mexico's political process has been highly exclusionary. Today less than
50 percent of the population participates in the electoral process and
even fewer share in the benefits. Since the days of the Porfiriato, the
system of government depends on a blend of co-optation and repression
financed by economic development. Diaz brought in foreign advisers and
money to relnvlgorate a sluggish and backward economy. Aleman brought in
the process of IS I to again start up an economy devastated by war and
depression.
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Mexico faces challenges which threaten to disrupt these threads of
consistency and stability that have characterized the political system
for six decades. The following section explores these challenges.
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III. CHALLENGES TO THE MODERN MEXICAN STATE
A. ECONOMIC CRISIS: INFLATION AND FOREIGN DEBT
The Mexican regime relies heavily on sustained economic growth to
facilitate legitimization of its system of government. The PR I depends
on funds generated by this growth to implement public works projects,
support huge public payrolls, and appease business elites without having
to resort to strict austerity measures or heavy taxation. The number one
cha I lenge to the current political system in Mexico is the economic
crisis evident in the ever-climbing inflation and the huge foreign debt.
1 . Inflation
Although a strict fiscal policy reduced inflation from 100
percent in 1982 to less than 60 percent in 1984, the collapse of the
peso, drop In international oil prices, and the two earthquakes in 1985
caused it to again skyrocket in 1986 and 1987. Mexico's inflation rate
for all of 1987 stood at 159.2 percent. What Is important to realize
here is the effect on the peasants and laborers. The regime depends upon
a lack of uncontrolled mobilization of peasants and labors, both of whom
have the dubious honor of suffering the most from both the brunt of
inflation and its remedy, the austerity program. Even before the current
economic austerity program, workers had lost 50 percent of their buying
power in the last six years. Unsatisfied demands or concerns of peasants
and laborers within a corporatist regime can boil over Into violence and
mass mobilization. The austerity measures Imposed through the recently
implemented Pact of Economic Solidarity to reduce inflation have already
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caused dissension among the business elite and brought new proposals from
labor leaders for nationwide strikes (Serra, 1987, 9).
The first phase of the new inflation program was designed to
Increase government revenues through a one-time price Increase of staple
goods. In early December, 1987, the government raised the price of
gasoline and electricity 85 percent and that of sugar 81 percent. Public
spending was reduced by trimming over-burdened payrolls through reduced
funding of public works projects and by selling off state-owned
enterprises. The result of this was the laying off of large numbers of
workers. (Serra, 1987, 9) President de la Madrid froze prices on other
consumer goods but also froze wages and devalued the peso 22 percent
thereby making foreign goods more expensive. Import duties were reduced
from 40 percent to 20 percent to counteract the rise in the price of
foreign goods usually evident in a currency devaluation; this had the
added effect of putting some domestic businesses under pressure to
compete with the foreign goods. Further layoffs or plant closures may
become evident. (Larmer, 1987, 7) As of November, 1988, the austerity
program had reduced inflation to one percent a month but at an extremely
high cost to the middle and lower classes.
2. The Foreign Debt Cr Is Is
Mexico's foreign debt crisis caught international attention in
August of 1982 when it became the first major debtor to run out of
foreign reserves needed to service its debt. This prompted bridging
loans and mass rescheduling on the part of banks and official lending
institutions to cover the payments and ease the debt payment burden
(Pastor, 1987, 7); exacerbation of the foreign debt problem was the only
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concrete result. This crisis developed in only 12 years as In 1970
Mexico had an almost zero balance on its foreign account.
In the 1970s, the oil producing nations of the world could not
spend all of their export revenues; they accumulated large reserves In
private banks. These private commercial banks, holding the excess
reserves of cash and not finding enough Investments, lent much of this
money in the third world, a large portion of it to Mexico. Mexico Itself
produced large export revenues through oil and had increased oil exports
from 96,000 barrels per day in 1975 to 1.1 million barrels per day by the
end of the decade. Yet the country chose to finance its growing desire
for imports with foreign borrowing of Middle East petrodollars. A world
recession prompted additional borrowing.
The worldwide recession in 1976 affected trade with the U.S. and
shrunk the annual growth rate to 2.1 percent (Average annual growth
between 1940 and 1970 was six percent) (Grayson, 1986, 153). The peso,
stable since 1954 at 12.5 to the dollar, had been devalued 42 percent in
1976. There was heavy capital flight of the newly borrowed funds and the
foreign debt was $18 billion by 1976 (Street, 1987, 101).
In the three decades after WWII, Latin American debt owed to
official, long-term, multilateral lending Institutions dropped from 50 to
12 percent. As the IMF and World Bank are dedicated to lending money for
development, not import purchases, Mexico found it increasing difficult
to provide the required loan justifications to these Institutions. It
had to turn to commercial banks for the financing it needed. (Pastor,
1987, 7) This resulted in a change in the character of the debt; long-
term loans from multilateral lending sources at lower Interest rates were
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replaced by short-term loans from commercial banks at higher interest
rates. As developing countries continued to request new loans,
commercial banks, including those within the United States, kept the
money supply turned on. But the price for tapping this supply became
increas ing\/h igher .
The Jump of international oil prices and Its affect on the United
States in 1979 and 1980 added to Latin America's debt problem. Trying to
stem the inflationary tendencies of rising oil prices, the U.S. Federal
Reserve Bank Instituted a stringent monetary policy. Short-term lending
rates by 1981 were 15.9 percent, up from 8.2 percent. Most of the loans
taken out by Mexico previous to this rate hike were negotiated on
floating-rate basis. (Pastor, 1987, 7) As the interest rates rose, so
did the payments.
The government policies of Mexico during the 1970s and 1980s
contributed to the problem of a growing percentage of export revenues
needed for debt servicing. The percentage of export revenues from goods
and services going to service the debt is as follows for Mexico.













One result of the government policies was the discouragement of non-oil
exports by facilitation of an over-valued exchange rate. This made
Mexico extremely dependent on world oil prices and therefore the foreign
policy decisions of other countries. In 1981, Mexico refused to lower
the price of crude oil and when the market changed from one belonging to
the sellers to one belonging to the buyers, export revenues dropped to
two-thirds of the expected amount. The policy also encouraged capital
flight; Mexicans invested In foreign currencies anticipating a
devaluation of their currency. By selling dollars to maintain the value
of the peso in the face of this capital flight, the regime depleted
foreign reserves needed to make debt payments. Even growth rates
rivaling those at the height of IS I could not bring in enough money to
service an ever-increasing debt.
Between 1979 and 1981, Mexico grew at an annual rate of eight
percent (Grayson, 1986, 153). Financed by oil and gas exports, (earnings
from exports reached $16 billion in 1980, $20 billion in 1981, and $21
billion in 1982-83) the administration of Lopez Port i Mo embarked on a
national development program. The plan emphasized expansion of the state
petroleum industry and promotion of new Industries to be located in 11
regional development zones (Street, 1987, 102). These industries were
afforded tariff protection under the existing Import substitution policy.
The development program couldn't handle revived consumer demands brought
on by the oil boom. Government policies put money into the income stream
before the expansion program could provide enough goods for consumers to
buy. Inevitably, imports, both legal and Illegal, rose to meet consumer
demand. (Between 1977 and 1981, imports of food, capital, and luxury
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goods rose from $6 billion to $23 billion.) This drained dollars from the
treasury which was additionally drained by poor management of PEMEX, the
state oil company. Lack of control allowed revenues from oil exports to
reach the hands of private individuals who sent the money out of the
country. In short, although export earnings were up significantly since
1980, there was a shortage in the balance of payments In 1982 and
monetary reserves increased only temporarily.
To keep from losing additional monies due to speculation, the
peso was allowed to float and It promptly dropped 45 percent. Later In
the year, the peso dropped an additional 35 percent. External debt was
$55 billion by 1982, more than three times what it had been six years
earlier. (Street, 1987, 102) Mexico suspended payment on principal and
interest to foreign banks, most located in the United States. Jesus
S i I va-Herzog , Minister of Finance for Mexico, announced in August 1982
that Mexico did not have enough foreign reserves to meet its debt payment
schedule.
Mexico agreed to cut the budget deficit from the current 16.5
percent of GDP In 1982 to 8.5 percent In 1983 ultimately reaching 3.5
percent In 1985. Mexico also agreed to limit foreign borrowing to $5
billion in 1983 and increase foreign currency reserves to $2 billion.
One additional goal was the moving to a unified exchange rate (Grayson,
1986, 154). But the debt crisis did not go away. Mexico could no longer
work within the previously agreed to austerity measures and requested
rescheduling of the debt.
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TABLE 7: MEXICAN DEBT RESCHEDULING (1982-1984)
(In Mill ions of Dol lars)
1982-1983 1983-1984
Amount Amount Amount Amount
Matur Ing Rescheduled Matur Ing Rescheduled
23,700 5,000 12,000 3,800
In 1985 and 1986, the foreign debt held steady at $97 billion but
massive capital flight continued. The $1.5 billion lost overseas In 1985
brought the total amount leaving the country since 1970 to over $40
billion. The government's public deficit continued to rise, standing in
1986 some 33 times larger than in 1980. In June, 1986, de la Madrid
again devalued his currency; this time It dropped 48 percent. High
inflation and a disappointing debt-reduction bond sale characterized
1987. The sale, cosponsored by one of the top ten U.S. banks, was
supposed to reduce the Mexican debt, through the sale of bonds, by as
much as $10 billion. The sale did not even reach ten percent of its
goal. By the middle of 1988, the foreign debt was over $107 billion.
The United States recently lent Mexico $3.5 billion in bridging loans to
ease the economic burden. The crisis continues.
B. INTER-ELITE TENSIONS: THE SPOILS SYSTEM
A spinoff of the foreign debt crisis is an exacerbation of the
growing discontent with the traditional formula for the management of
inter-elite relations and elite-middle class relations. The top priority
for the political elite is to prevent a union of dissatisfied middle
sector elements with dissident elites. This dissatisfaction is brought
on by unfulfilled expectations due to the economic problems in the
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country. This deepening crisis makes the regime's efforts to achieve a
reharmonizat ion of elite interests critical, but difficult given the
nature of the discontent over the nation's economic problems. Further,
there is a tendency for the political elite to try and monopolize
Increasingly scarce resources. The state must solve the problem of
Inter-elite tensions and growing political distance between the
corporatlst structure and the disaffected middle sectors. (Gentleman,
1987, 7-8)
1 . Tradl t lona I Popul Ism
In a 1983 article, Steven Sanderson discusses the problems of
presidential succession and elite tension in Mexico. Three assumptions
of his study were (1) the economy effects the coalition of political
elites, (2) the Influence of the PR I Is dependent on the character of
this coalition of elites, and (3) the change in Mexico to an oil-based
economy fundamentally changed the nature of the political elite: from the
career politicians of the PR I and their popul ist-red istr ibut I ve reward
system (traditional populism) t£ career bureaucrats and tecnicos and
their oil-patronage system (new populism). (Sanderson, 1983, 317)
Traditional populism was the spoils system used by the PR I before
oil became the major export commodity. This spoils (reward) system had
as Its foundation five principles dating back to the revolution.
1. Encouragement of entrepreneurial aspirations.
2. Protection of nascent industry through tariffs and exchange-rate
pol Icies.
3. Encouragement of foreign Investment.
4. Worker Inclusion, through wage Improvements, in the benefits of
increased productivity and improved technology.
5. Agrarian reform with emphasis on land redistribution.
(Sanderson, 1983, 319)
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Between 1934 and 1976 presidents like Cardenas, Mateos and
Echeverria epitomized traditional populism, instituting policies aimed at
reducing the social and economic Inequity of their broad-based support
group; they believed in agrarian reform. At the same time, these men
promoted the concept of Import Substitution Industrialization and foreign
investment. (Dominguez, 1982, pp. 202-211)
No one more characterized traditional populism than Cardenas.
He was a president of the people; he possessed the charisma needed to
Inspire and lead. Cardenas often made difficult policy choices based on
the advice of the masses (Meyer and Sherman, 1987, 596). Cardenas knew
the value and power of popular approval. As a story goes, one day the
president's secretary laid a list of important concerns and a telegram in
front of Cardenas. The list said:
Bank reserves dangerously low. "Tell the Treasurer," said
Cardenas. Agricultural production falling. "Tell the Minister of
Agriculture." Railroads bankrupt. "Tell the Minister of
Communications." Serious message from Washington. "Tell Foreign
Affairs." Then he opened the telegram which read: My corn dried, my
burro died, my sow was stolen, my baby is sick. Signed, Pedro Juan,
village of Hui tz
I
ipi tuzco. "Order the presidential train at once,"
said Cardenas. " I am leaving for Hui tz
I
ipi tuzco. " (Brenner, 1971, 91)
Cardenas was genuinely committed to social reform and the
redistribution of wealth. Additionally, he still concerned himself with
Inflation, declining oil revenues, capital flight, and declining foreign
Investment (Meyer and Sherman, 1987, 606). The Cardenas administration
with its emphasis on both social progress and economic growth epitomized
the eclectic nature of the revolutionary elite.
The Mateos sexenio emphasized the adherence to revolutionary
principles; foreign policy was leftist In practice and small agricultural
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growers were protected. Mexico's support of Cuba helped maintain
internal stability by effectively maintaining the "left" side of the PR I
within the elite coalition. Mexico was the only Latin American country
that did not break diplomatic relations with Cuba when Organization of
American States (OAS) sanctions were imposed. Under President Mateos,
the size and power of the Mexican Coffee Institute (INMECAFE) grew while
protecting and promoting small coffee businesses. The institute
continued to expand under the guidance of Echeverria although it was all
but dismantled under President Port I Mo. (Dominguez, 1982, pp. 208-210).
Populist policies characterized the 1934-1976 time period,
perhaps reaching their peak during the Cardenas, Mateos, and Echeverria
sexenlos. The ruling elite coalition had at its core the career
politicians of the PR I . The official party of the regime co-opted the
broad support base and maintained internal stability through a spoils
system within a traditional populist model. All of this changed in the
mid-1970s with the discoveries of large deposits of oil near the Gulf of
Mexico and in the southern part of the country. This new-found wealth
shifted power from the career politicians to a group often referred to as
tecnlcos, or technocrats.
2. The 01 l-Based Patronage System
In 1976 Mexico discovered major oil deposits In the south. As
the decade came to an end, the largest oil field discoveries In the world
since 1970 belonged to Mexico. In 1979, Pemex , the national oil company,
estimated an oil potential of 200 billion barrels. This is second in the
world only to Saudi Arabia with 215 billion barrels. David Ronfeldt, in
a study conducted for the U.S. Department of Energy, did not believe
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the potential was quite as high but ranked Mexico with at a minimum, Iraq
and Venezuela, with the possibility only the United States and Saudi
Arabia ultimately out producing Mexico (Ronfeldt, 1980, 33). The first
president to benefit from this discovery was Port i Mo.
The election of Port! Mo brought with it a new populism: this
populism used a spoils system arising from an economy "fueled" by oil.
The downfall of traditional populism in 1976 was caused by the rise of
private interest groups outside of PR I corporatlst Institutions, the
disenchantment of the middle class with revolutionary goals, and the
economic crisis in 1976. The private sector groups opposed agrarian
reform, especially land redistribution; relative independence from the
regime made co-optation of these groups relatively ineffective. The
financial crisis in the mid-70s had two effects on domestic policies.
Programs for redistribution of wealth could not be maintained and often
the middle class suffered most from the shortfall. Additionally, the
problem of servicing the foreign debt highlighted the problems of trying
to maintain high levels of spending for social development while pursuing
low tax rates and export-led growth. (Sanderson, 1983, 322).
The post-1976 state in Mexico Is committed primarily to economic
growth and accumulation and only in a secondary manner to redistribution
of the benefits of this growth. Workers are compensated by non-wage
benefits. Food subsidies replace agrarian reform. The flexibility of
the current political system then Is reduced when the oil revenues which
"lubricate" the system, are In decline. (Sanderson, 1983, pp. 333-334)
Under Port II lo agrarian reform was abandoned; real wages declined
every year during his sexenlo. The oil boom gave the Port! Mo government
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the means to control mobilization and discontent through food subsidies
and social security benefits. However, Port i Mo lost support from
peasants and laborers by emphasizing economic growth over labor and
agrar ian reform.
The Port! Mo regime pushed trickle-down economic policies instead
of social reform. The subsidy system of the 1976-1982 period was
financed by the oil boom which also bankrolled bloated public payrolls.
The Import Substitution Industrialization model of the 1940-1970 period
was replaced by debt-led growth In the mid-1970s. As the plight of the
workers worsened and agrarian reform withered away, the PR I became less
important in the electoral process. No longer was it the controller of
the government reward system so as to control local politics. Its role
in formulating the six-year plan of the sexenio was taken by the tecnicos
and bureaucrats. Political reforms in 1977 were the most sweeping in
recent history and further weakened the hegemony of the PR I in party
pol i t ics.
The new populism of the oil-patronage model depended on elite-
coalition building as did the traditional model. But due to control of
oil revenues and their distribution, state bureaucrats (tecnicos)
replaced the politicians of the PR I as the dispensers of rewards and
patronage. This new model is In fact characterized by its use of the
revenues of the oil boom as a substitute for actual agrarian and urban
reform. The goals of the revolution became nothing more than rhetoric:
subsidies for food staples instead of land redistribution and social
security benefits to lessen the blow of repressive wage policies. New
populism has guiding principles and the main tenets include:
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1. trade expansion and liberalization emphasizing comparative
advantage and reduced tariffs;
2. an enlarged public sector to include more state-owned companies,
and;
3. increased centralization and reliance on technical expertise as
during the Porfiriato.
This decline in the influence of the PR I with the advent of new
populism, accompanied by the liberalizing of the electoral system, IMF-
Imposed austerity measures, and a $105 billion foreign debt led to
Instability during the de la Madrid presidency. Emphasis on economic
growth is tolerated during periods of rapid expansion of the GDP but is
cause for instability during periods of contraction like that experienced
during the de la Madrid presidency (Sanderson, 1983, 402). The
instability was avoided during the Port I Mo years as huge programs for
rural health, food production, social security, and Job creation were
made possible through oil patronage. But for de la Madrid, oil revenues
were used In an attempt to cope with debt-service obligations.
(Sanderson, 1983, 405).
In President de la Madrid's administration, there were two
opinions voiced concerning the correct oil policy (Grayson, 1986, 155).
The so called pragmatists, headed by PEMEX Director General Mario Ramon
Beteta and SI Iva-Herzog, the Finance Minister, wanted to tie the price of
crude to oil prices on the world market. While maintaining a
nationalistic policy, they wanted to maintain contact with OPEC. This
group wanted to continue supplying oil to the poorer countries in the
region but Insisted these countries continue to pay 80 percent of the
international market price.
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The second group was the nationalists led by the Energy Minister
Francisco Labastida Ochoa, and Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda Amor.
They were not as convinced that market forces alone should determine the
price of oil. Some price fixing was necessary. They would also allow
the poorer countries In the region, specifically Nicaragua, to have much
easier terms in repaying Imported oil. The decision by de la Madrid in
the spring of 1985 to side with the nationalists cost the country
valuable export earnings. Because the price of crude remained at a
February 1985 price, even while members of OPEC were cheating by selling
on the spot market and thereby driving the price of oil down, exports
dropped from 1.4 million barrels per day to 783,000 (Grayson, 1986, 157).
When prices were finally cut in July 1985, the barrels per day went back
up to 1.48 million thereby validating the pragmatist view, but the damage
had been done.
3. Teen I cos Ascend Ing
The rise of tecnicos like Port! Mo and de la Madrid brought men
to power with different backgrounds and goals than the politicians
preceding them. These men were highly educated, often at foreign
universities. Being career bureaucrats, they did not have the large
personal fol lowings characteristic of career politicians. Because of
this they were not swayed as much by special Interest groups. The
tdcnlcos liberalized the economy, loosening the restrictions on foreign
investment. While still nationalistic, their loyalty is to the regime,
not the people. Presidents in recent sexenios tend to come more from big
cities and Identify less with the laborers and peasants whom they
represent and more with t6cnlcos (Ronfeldt, 1985, 12). These presidents
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caused a rightward shift in the regime. The conservative movement
granted more power to private business through anti-strike platforms and
less power to the leftist popular movements (Sanderson, 1983, 403). This
shift in support somewhat alienated labor and peasants, traditionally the
strongest sources of support. By shrinking the support base, the chances
of internal Instability increased In that a majority of the people could
no longer be co-opted effectively through two of the three corporatist
organizations. Always a group to be watched for signs of instability,
the middle-class in Mexico has suffered greatly from the economic
situation in the country. Middle class families feel many of the
consequences of inflation due to their life-styles (private education,
consumer durables) and their lesser participation in price-controlled
goods and services such as subsidized health, food distribution and
public transportation (Bailey, 1987, 65). The De la Madrid
Administration recognized this constituency, the largely unorganized,
disaffected, mostly young and relatively well-educated urban middle
class, as one of its major political challenges (Cornelius, 1987, 34).
C. GOVERNMENT AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR
Of particular significance In the contemporary malaise of the Mexican
political system Is the breakdown of relations between government and the
business sector. The outcome of these relations will have important
economic and political implications, since they will shape the course of
Mexico's future political stability and economic growth. Business is the
PRI's most powerful political rival, and its economic Importance comes
from the reluctance of Mexican businessmen to make Investments in a
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system which has lost their confidence. Yet restoring private-sector
Investment is important to Mexico's economic recovery. Government-
business relations in Mexico will to a large degree determine the extent
and speed of political opening in Mexico's single-party dominated
political regime. If the economy does not recover, concessions in the
form of recognition of opposition mayoral or gubernatorial victories
might have to be made to control mobilization. This would happen as an
alternative to repression.
In the 1970s, economic and political problems began to erode the
business-government pact. Port i Mo expropriated the nation's banks in an
effort to regain control over the economy, particularly industrial
development and heavy capital flight. The expropriation created economic
uncertainty and tremendous distrust and suspicion on the part of business
elites in the Mexican government. A majority of businessmen in 1989
believe their Interests are not adequately represented by the
contemporary political system. (Maxfield, 1987, 3) The community is
however divided and cannot present a united front. The PRI exploits
these divisions through policies which aim to divide and conquer the
business community.
Mexican businessmen are divided regarding their appropriate level of
political participation In at least four different ways. The first
position, held mostly by small and medium-sized Industrialists, favors
the incorporation of business Into the PRI as its fourth corporatlst
sector. A second point of view is Indicative of many older, conservative
businessmen; they object to any call for change In relations between
business and the political system. A third group of businessmen believes
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in the need for change but favors the moderate approach of limiting
political activity to individuals and pressuring the system both from
within the PR I and from the opposition. A final group favors radical
change in the political system and believes business should be the
vanguard of that change (Maxfield, 1987, pp. 1-4).
The business sector will obviously play a key role In the economic
future of Mexico. What Is not obvious Is the type of role It will play:
supporter of regime policies or facilitator of change. These
entrepreneurs and managers are advisedly wary after massive peso
devaluations and a nationalization of the banking system. They do not
want to invest in the factors of production or keep large deposits of
money in a country where inflation Is high and the currency is unstable.
This is certainly evidenced by the almost $40 billion in currency that
has left the country in the last 18 years. The government's handling of
this group, be it appeasement, co-optation, or repression, will largely
determine whether or not business decides to increase its participation
in the political arena and push for change. Other groups desiring
change, often radical, In the existing political system, are the
oppos 1 1 ion part ies.
D. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES
There are many opposition parties, nine received significant support
in the 1985 mid-term elections. The two largest are, on the right, the
PAN, and on the left, the National Democratic Front Coalition. The PAN
received 16 percent of the vote in the 1982 presidential elections and 17
percent in the 1988 elections. The National Democratic Front Coalition
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was created only in early 1988 yet garnered over 31 percent of the vote
In the presidential elections. This coalition is lead by Cuauht6moc
Cardenas, son of the former Mexican president. The following sections
explore the opposition from both sides of the political spectrum.
1 . Pol I tics on the Left
The student-popular movement of 1968 and its bloody repression by
the Ordaz government shook the Mexican political system; significant
sectors of Mexican society underwent considerable rad ica I I zat ion. The
ideology of the ruling elite, often explained as the goals of the Mexican
Revolution, began to lose its efficacy to various segments of the
population. Among the Mexican intelligentsia, the notion that the
Mexican Revolution of 1910 represented an expression of the popular will
was greatly weakened by the events of 1968. Many of these Intellectuals
and a section of the middle class embraced Marxism, although most of the
working class and peasantry still believed in the ideology of the Mexican
Revolution. The economic and political difficulties of the 1970s opened
up new options for the Mexican left and created breaches In the
corporatist system of the PR I
.
In November, 1981, the Mexican Communist Party (Partido Comunista
Mexicano, PCM) dissolved and together with four other parties,
established the United Socialist Party of Mexico (Partido Social Ista
Uniflcado de Mexico, or PSUM) (Carr, 1986, 3-5). The PSUM however, has
not gained a national following and In fact is losing strength. In the
1985 elections the PSUM garnered 353,000 less votes than in 1982 and lost
five seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Horcasitas, 1987, 17). In 1988
the PSUM and Its candidate Heberto Castillo publicly endorsed Cuauhtemoc
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Cardenas and his coalition, the National Democratic Front. In his
endorsement speech Castillo stated that
I can see that the people of Mexico desire change, but not as
profound, as radical as we are offering in the Mexican Socialist Party.
Because of this, they have turned to Cardenas. (Hughes, 1988, 0127)
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, possessing the first name of one of the
greatest Aztec emperors and the last name of perhaps the most revered
president in Mexican history, officially accepted the nomination of the
Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido Autentico de la
Revolucion Mexlcana, PARM) . He also earned the support of the PSUM as
well as other leftist parties and so formed his National Democratic
Front. General goals of the front Include a change In the debt payment
schedule of the foreign debt and a larger role for the government In the
economy. The Front consists of (1) the PARM: formed In 1954 by former
members of the PR I ; (2) the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Popular
Social ista, PPS): founded in 1929 with a goal of national socialism; (3)
the PSUM and its candidate Castillo; and (4) the Cardenas front
(Pichardini , 1988, 1555).
Cardenas, the 54 year old former PR I senator and governor of the
state of Michoacan, southwest of Mexico City, was the leader of a
minority group within the PRI called the Democratic Current. When the
PRI rejected his demands for primary elections to determine presidential
candidates as well as other reforms, he left his post In 1986 to accept
the nomination of the PARM. Later forming his National Front, he ran on
a nationalist and populist platform. Cardenas feels the PRI abandoned
the revolutionary goals of social and economic reform along with
redistribution of wealth. Although agreeing that International trade
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with the U.S. should be expanded, Cardenas feels development of domestic
industry has been neglected at the cost of badly needed jobs. Earlier
calling for forgiveness of the entire Mexican debt, Cardenas now backs
only a suspension of payments under the current arrangements; he Is also
campaigning for reforms in the Judicial system. (Angelo, 1988, 0258)
2. Pol It Ics on the Right
Motivated by a desire to protect their financial interests from
the encroaching "socialism" of Lazaro Cardenas, many businessmen were
among the early founders of the main opposition party of the right: the
PAN. As In most political parties, the leading group was lawyers.
Bankers were the second best represented group. (Story, 1987, 265)
The PAN is one of the oldest of the legal opposition parties and
has emerged as a broadly based opposition. Its political interests span
a spectrum from the center to the right. In the past the PAN has been a
party of conservative Catholics, big business, and prominent interests In
the North; today It attracts support from the urban middle-class,
government employees, blue-collar workers, small entrepreneurs, young
urban professionals, and slum dwellers. The party's candidate for the
1988 elections was Manuel Clouthier, a 53 year old millionaire and
rancher from Slnaloa, a northwestern state bordering the Gulf of
California. He ran on a platform In support of the freemarket system,
reduction In government control, and Increased foreign investment.
Additionally, Clouthier supported individual ownership of land (Mexico,
1988, 0201).
The PAN has never had the kind of organization, financing, or
membership to support a successful nationwide contest with the PRI for
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control of the national government. The PAN persuaded a large segment of
Northern citizens that their economic and political welfare depends on
the party's Increased influence in local and national affairs. (Stevens,
1987, 228) Although gains are most evident in the North, the PAN
expanded support in Mexico, Jalisco, Puebla, and in the Federal District.
It's gaining strength in Yucatan, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosl. These
states are all in the south central or southern part of the country. The
PAN has won a number of local elections; however It has little backing
among many poor, Indian and mestizo states in central and southern Mexico
and has no following among rural peasantry. The PAN is too strong to be
co-opted by the ruling regime and will continue to grow even if the




There has been a shift in political relations with the armed forces.
Unlike the situation after 1940 where the armed forces had lessening
influence in government, civil-military relations are now based on the
relative levels of professionalism attained by both the political and
military elites. Simply put, the more professional the relationship
between the two groups, the less likely the chance of military
Intervention. (Ackroyd, 1982, 2) The following sections trace the
evolution of both military and civilian professionalism.
1
.
Ml I I tary Professional Ism and Its Effects
When predicting military behavior, at least two models of
professionalism can be built. In the first, as military competence
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Increases, chances for intervention (here defined as both coups and
military governments) decline. New technology necessitating complex
military strategy demands much study; there is little time to become
involved In politics. This model will be labeled "traditional"
professionalism; It seems to closely follow the tenets of the
"traditional" professionalism mentioned In Samuel Huntington's book, The
Soldier and the State.
A second model argues professionalism may encourage intervention;
the orientation of the National Security Doctrine determines whether
armed forces in a country will interfere with civilian rule. If military
doctrine emphasizes defense against an external threat, there will be no
Intervention. However, a perceived threat from within, as in guerrilla
activity, causes the armed services to emphasize national development and
to "train for" positions in government traditionally held by civilians;
it may be the duty of the armed forces to replace civilian leadership if
that civilian elite is not effective (Ackroyd, 1982, pp. 3-4). This
explanation follows the description of "pragmatic" professionalism given
by Morr is Janowl tz in h is book , The Profess lona I Sold ier and will be so
labeled In this study. This "pragmatic" model determines there Is no
external threat to Latin America; therefore the reason for the military's
existence must be protection against the Internal threat. If this is
true, then the second of the two models of professionalism with its
emphasis on an Internal or external security threat Is the most
appropriate for a study of Latin American militaries. (This Is not at
odds with the discussion of external threat in this thesis as the
problems in Central America ultimately impact internally on Mexico).
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It would then follow that as professionalism Increases among the
militaries of the region, the number of coups and military governments
will increase. (Ackroyd, 1982, 4) The question then becomes, "How does
one explain the lack of intervention on the part of the Mexican military
In light of its increased professionalism?" The answer Is that in
theory, the model does work but must be "refined" for the Mexican case.
A problem with the pragmatic model is Its definition of military
intervention as simply a coup or military government. If "Intervention"
can be separated from "participation", that is participation in the
decisionmaking processes of the government, the predictive capability of
this model for Mexico is increased. One can then say a rise in
professionalism brings with it a corresponding rise in participation but
a decrease In the probability of a coup (Ackroyd, 1982, 8).
In Mexico, the substantive education of the military elite
produces a highly professionalized, effective, and disciplined armed
forces (Ackroyd, 1982, 11). Discipline is one of the key "measures" of
professional Izat ion (Huntington, 1965, 404) and Mexico has one of the
most disciplined officer corps in Latin America (Ackroyd, 1982, 13).
Emphasis on this Instills in the officer the Importance of following the
orders and rules of the highest authorities: in Mexico's case the
political regime. Military members who criticize the civilian government
are quickly retired or moved to undesirable positions (Ackroyd, 1982,
14). The military elite impose the same standards on civilian society.
Order and discipline must be maintained; respect for authority Is
paramount. "Authority is first, since order cannot exist If there Is no
authority which sustains and imposes it." (Soto, 1975, 47)
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The ruling civilian elite takes advantage of this training by co-
opting military officers into the existing corporatist system. Top
retired officers receive positions In the government retaining both their
military and civilian pay. The military as an institution is allowed, by
this political elite, to be involved in the decision-making process at
both the state and national level. (Ronfeldt, 1976, 295) This can be
destabilizing in a multi-party system as the armed forces could split
along party lines. And so to the model needs to be added that a number
of viable political parties create a threat to the military institution:
the greater the threat, the more likely military intervention (Ackroyd,
1982, pp. 16-17). Mexico has not been subject to this threat as only one
party has led the government since 1929.
The importance of this cannot be over emphasized in light of
Mexico's electoral reform permitting easier entry of new parties into the
existing political system. Important also Is the consolidation of a
number of communist and social is'., parties under the umbrella of the
National Democratic Front of Cardenas.
The professionalism (level of competence) of the civilian
government is also key to the civil-military relationship. However, it
is the civilian elites' perceived level of competence (perceived in the
eyes of the military) which determines the actions of the armed forces
vis-a-vis the political elite (Ackroyd, 1982, 17). It Is for this reason
the ruling political elite In Mexico must prove their efficacy to top
military officers. It follows then that if civilian competence is high,
given an advanced level of military professionalism, the relationship
between the two will be characterized by an exchange of ideas. On the
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other hand, if civilians are incompetent, the military will merely send
its dictums to the civilian leaders.
Tecnicos, currently led by Carlos Salinas de Gortarl, must prove
to the military they are effective in guarding against internal
Instability. The pragmatic model of professionalism, as It pertains to
Latin America, sets up the Internal threat as the number one problem for
the armed forces. As a ml I I tary el I te with a high level of competence
(professionalism) sees a civilian regime losing the ability to control
this internal threat, intervention becomes more likely. The current
ruling elite in Mexico can quell the military's fears in two ways.
First, they can demonstrate a capability to control social unrest, caused
by shrinking support from an oil-patronage rewards system, through
selective repression or co-optation. Secondly, the ruling elite can
demonstrate to military leaders the ability to maintain an armed forces,
even under austere conditions, capable of quelling uncontrolled
upr Is ings.
There has been an increase in the size, modernization, and
professionalism of the Mexican military forces. Troop strength has
increased from 80000 to over 129000. The army's force structure and size
have changed considerably since the 1960s. In 1960 there were only two
brigades. Today there are five (The presidential guard being considered
a brigade) with an armored brigade being formed. Of the 68 Infantry
battalions, 20 were formed after 1970. (Ronfeldt, 1985, 7) The defense
budget was only $567 million In 1979 (1987 dollars). Today it is over
$1.4 billion (1987 dollars). In 1981 the army had only 72,000 members
compared to 95,000 today. All three services have new equipment. The
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army has armored Panhard vehicles from France, new indigenous armored
personnel carriers, and automatic rifles produced under a license from
West Germany. The navy has locally built patrol boats, destroyers from
the United States, and frigates from Spain. The Air Force has F-5s from
the United States and trainer aircraft from Switzerland (Ronfeldt, 1985,
3).
TABLE 11: MEXICAN ARMED FORCES
Total Armed Forces (1984): 129,000
Reserves: 1,500,000
Defense Expenditure (1987): $1.4 billion
Defense Expenditure as % of GDP
Defense Expenditure as % of CGE




Arms Production: Infantry weapons; ammunition;
AFVs; small naval vessels;
I Ight a I rcraf t
(World Military Expenditures, 1987, 85)
*CGE - Central government expenditures
A modernization of the officer himself has also taken place.
Two of the primary "educators" are the Heroico Colegio Militar
(HCM), established in 1926, and *.he Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG),
established in 1932. These schools Instill the ideas of discipline,
morality, and unit cohesion. All Army officers receive a four-year
education at the HCM: 300-350 graduate annually. In 1976, the Mexican
government built completely new facilities for the school. Specialist
training Is at the Centro de Aplicaclon para Oflclales de las Armas
(Application Center for Military Officers) and advanced professional
military education Is at the National Defense College, built in 1981.
This school provides senior officers courses In national security
doctrine and geopolitics. Formerly the highest level of training, the
ESG, or Superior War College, now trains officers generally In the ranks
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of Lieutenant through Lieutenant Colonel. Courses taught include
military strategy and tactics, staff coordination, and foreign attache
duty. Air Force officers receive four-year degrees at the Colegio del
Aire (Air College) and go on to graduate work at schools abroad, for the
most part in the United States. Like both the Army and Navy officers,
they attend the Escuela Superior de Guerra and the National Defense
College. (English, 1984, 321) The Navy's military academy is at
Veracruz and graduates 30-50 cadets a year. Courses are also Included
for both Marine and Navy fliers.
2. A Greater Role In State Af fal rs
The military's greater role in the business of the state as
Illustrated by its participation In decisionmaking at the national level,
and its force modernization is a reaction by the current political elite
to the increasing pressures of internal Instability. This instability is
caused by a shrinking of the historically large support base of laborers
and peasants. This support base shrunk as the revolutionary goals and
populist redistr ibut i ve system were replaced by an oil-patronage model in
the mld-70s. The military, never tolerant of Instability or lack of
discipline, must be convinced by the tecnicos that "things won't get out
of hand." One way to do this is to keep the services modernized and
properly educated in order to properly respond to any threat.
3. Final Thoughts: The Ml I Itary
The Mexican armed forces are ever increasing their level of
professionalism. Higher level military schools like the HCM and the ESG
are not only teaching courses In advanced military strategy but also in
public and government administration. It Is important for the
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civilian elite to realize the significance of this advancement in
training and theory.
Government in Mexico must present itself as strong and capable of
dealing with any threat to the stability of the country. Assuming the
pragmatic model of professionalism applies to the Mexican military, any
Instability or lack of competence shown by the ruling elite could be met
with military intervention. Something that threatens stability in Mexico
Is the problems in Central America. One of the authors of the Contadora
initiative, Mexico clearly believes that peace in Central America is in
its national interest. The following section explores the major actors
in that region of the world and how they impact on Mexico.
F. CASTRO, COMMUNISM, AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
With the advent of the 26th of July Movement in Cuba in 1959, along
with the principle of exporting revolution, the possibility of communist
Insurgency and uncontrolled mobilization in Latin America became more
likely. Cuba's declared support of the Soviet Union after 1960 provided
strong justification for the revolutionary movement of Castro. This
allowed him to pursue anti-imperialist policies abroad without having to
concentrate on domestic concerns. (Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, 1986, 51) On
December 2, 1961, Castro stated "I am a Marxist-Leninist and I shall be a
Marxist-Leninist until I die." (Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, 1986, 47)
Castro sought to export the Cuban-style revolution throughout the
Western Hemisphere, first concentrating on the Caribbean and Central
America, then later South America (Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, 1986, 59). The
means to the ends included violence through both frontal attack and
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guerrilla tactics. Additionally, Cuba was to be a staging ground for the
recruitment, support, and training of guerrillas (Gonzalez and Ronfeldt,
1986, 122). Almost every country in Latin America has "alumni" from the
three to six month "schools" in Cuba (Department of State, 1985, 10).
Being the self-appointed leader of the revolutionary left, the Cuban
strongman maintains close contact with radical and guerrilla movements in
the individual Latin American countries (Gonzalez and Ronfeldt, 1986,
42). Violence and uncontrolled mobilization, brought on by (1) the huge
disparity between the "haves" and "have-nots" and most probably
exacerbated by (2) communist influence centered In Havana, were
characteristic of Mexico between 1968 and the mid-1970s.
1 . Terror Ism and Guerr I I las: Mex Ico's Struggles from Within
By the late 1960s, segments of the Mexican population decided
more forceful measures were needed to relnvigorat« efforts toward
achieving the goals of the 1910 revolution: most specifically that of
redistribution of wealth. Urban guerrillas received support from both
students in the universities and the landless peasants In their efforts
to "redistribute the wealth." Student support manifested itself In
public demonstrations and denouncements while peasant support included
food and shelter. (Williams, 1977, 50) Guerrilla activity was most
pronounced during the early 1970s as the economy of the country
col lapsed.
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TABLE 8: MEXICAN TERRORIST GROUPS OF THE 70'S
1. Liga Comunista 23 de septiembre; 23rd of Sept Communist League
named for date of a raid on a Chihuahua army base in 1967 (Bloom,
1976, 32). Founded and led by Demetrio Torralva Alvarez until his
capture June 1975 (Crozier, 1974, 110).
2. ACNR ; Asociacion Civlca Nacional Revoluc ionar ia ; National Civic
Revolutionary Association. Founded in 1968. (U.S. Congress,
1974, 24)
3. MAR; Movlmiento de Accion Revolucionar ia ; Revolutionary Action
Movement. Group received guerrilla training in North Korea at
training camps reported to be Soviet KGB operations. (U.S.
Congress, 1974, 24)
4. UP; Union del Pueblo; Union of the People; Maoist terrorist group
broken up in 1972. (U.S. Congress, 1974, 24)
5. LCA; Liga de Comunistas Armados; League of Armed Communists.
Activities confined to Mexico City and Monterrey. (U.S. Congress,
1974, 24)
6. FUZ; Frente Urbano Zapatista; Zapata Urban Front. Specialized in
robbing banks in Pueblo and Monterrey. (U.S. Congress, 1974, 25)
7. FRAP; Fuerzas Revoluc ionar ias Armadas del Pueblo; People's
Revolutionary Armed Forces. Followers of Trotskyist theories.
(U.S. Congress, 1974, 25)
8. Partldo de los Pobres; Poor People's Party. Active in southwest
area of Mexico, vaguely Marxist in content. The founder, Lucio
Cabanas, killed by army troops, is a folk hero to Mexicans.
(U.S. Congress, 1974, 25)
The guerrilla activity that took place during these years
manifested itself in the form of bank robberies and kidnappings. These
guerrillas kidnapped and later killed prominent figures in both business
and politics. Among the political figures were then US VIce-Consul John
Patterson and British counsel Anthony Duncan Williams. Bank robberies,
such as the 2.4 million pesos taken In 1974, were used to finance
activities of the various groups.
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The army's apparent inability to halt the terrorism was of great
concern to the ruling elite. Uncontrolled, these terrorist acts could
have initiated riots in the streets and the possible mobilization of
large segments of the population. Additionally, the military could have
felt the need to intervene in the affairs of the regime, blaming them for
the problems of society that fostered these guerrillas. The military
believed security was a precondition for stability, which was a
precondition for development. If Mexico was to continue its impressive
growth, security would have to be regained. Of great concern was the
defense of the oil fields, in the central and southern parts of the
country, and the maintenance of stability In Mexico City.
The potential for Mexico to guard the oil fields is clearly
limited. The military is concentrated In Mexico City with various
battalions scattered throughout the country. The army could deal with a
disturbance In either the oil fields or Mexico City but not both
(Ronfeldt, 1985, 24). Mexico City is potentially unstable with
approximately 20 percent of the entire population of the country (84
million) crowded into an area that realistically should be supporting
less than 10 percent. There is not enough water to adequately supply the
city now; water rationing is an everyday, year-round occurrence for all
social classes. Although at a high elevation, Mexico City is in a valley
which traps all vehicle pollutants causing some of the dirtiest
conditions In the world. Projections for the year 2000 put the
population at five million beyond what the natural resources in the area
could minimally support. Mexico City Is among the five most polluted
cities in the world; the transportation and social services are stretched
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to the breaking point. Yet every year, the outer boundaries of the city
expand as peasants from the rural areas move into the shanty towns
surrounding the center of the city. With a total military force of only
129,000, any defense of the oil fields due to terrorist acts would leave
Mexico City unprotected and unsupervised. This could lead to
uncontrolled mobilization and possible splits in the ranks of the elite.
Mexico is fearful of a return to the terrorism of the 1970's.
There are bigger targets now than prominent businessmen or political
figures; there are the oil reserves. The oil fields represent the
economic and psychological lifeline of the country. They have allowed
Mexico to become a more prominent member on the world stage. Partly for
this reason, Mexico maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba even when
faced with gestures of disapproval from the United States. It was the
only Latin American country to maintain ties with Cuba In the 1960s.
Fidel Castro attended the inauguration of Salinas In December 1988, his
first return to the country since 1956. Through its recognition of
Castro, Mexico feels the Cuban leader will keep his communist-sponsored
terrorism confined to other parts of the hemisphere, most likely Central
Amer lea
.
2. Centra I Amer lea
By the early 1980s, the Sandinista overthrow of the Somoza
government, and domestic conflict In El Salvador caused concern among
the Mexican elite (Karl, 1986, 274). Initially, Mexico supported the
concept of non-intervention and self-determination in the region,
although not due to any altruistic concern. Progressive elements within
the regime were afraid of what a defeat of the rebels in El Salvador and
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the government of Nicaragua due to U.S. intervention would mean.
Conservative elites would see concessions to other political and
economic interests increasing unnecessary as the U.S. would solve any
problems if uprisings did occur. These more progressive elites realized
such concessions were necessary to power groups, but they wanted to
gauge how much. (Farer, 1985, 64) It was soon painfully evident,
especially in the cases of Nicaragua and El Salvador, what had started
as a populist, leftist movement had quickly transformed itself into a
communist Insurgency promising to destabilize the region more so than
rising expectations on the part of the Mexican elite,
a. Nicaragua
When the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)
overthrew Somoza in July 1979 they pledged "free elections, political
pluralism, a mixed economy, and a non-aligned foreign policy."
(Department of State, 1985, 19) The realities have been completely
different; Nicaragua is under communist influence. The national
industrial and agricultural base, as well as the banking system, are now
under state control. The media is censored on a daily basis;
neighborhood watch committees and informant networks manage to intimidate
the general populous. Over 120,000 Nicaraguans have left the country due
to poor management of the economy and human rights violations (Department
of State, 1985, 20). What is of greater concern for peace in Central
America and the Caribbean however, is the massive buildup of




In February 1981, the FSLN announced the planned formation of
a 200,000 man force to defend the country against counter-revolutionaries
(Department of State, 1985, 21). This was of concern to Mexico as the
size of the Mexican military in 1981 numbered approximately 125,000.
Immediately after deposing Somoza, the Nicaraguan army had three tanks,
25 armored cars, seven helicopters, and three artillery pieces. As of
1985 the numbers in the Inventory show 340 tanks and other armored
vehicles, in excess of 70 howitzers and rocket launchers, and 30
helicopters. Included in the armored-vehicle total are 110 Soviet-built
T-55 medium tanks and 30 PT-76 light tanks. The T-55s are more powerful
than anything else available in Central America; the PT-76s are
amphibious and capable of river crossings. The helicopter Inventory now
includes the Mi-24 HIND of the Soviet Union. The Mi-24 is one of the
fastest helicopters In the world and from Nicaragua, could attack targets
in Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica.
Soviet and Cuban investment in Infrastructure has been no
less "impressive." Over $100 million has been invested in the Nicaraguan
economy with $70 million of that for military construction (Department
of State, 1985, 27). Although investment by the Soviets and Cubans In
Nicaragua decreased from the initial high numbers, the overall emphasis
on this Central American country illustrates the Importance of this
country for communism as another "Cuba" In the Western hemisphere. In
1982 Brezhnev recognized the "imperialist threat to Nicaragua." In 1983
and 1984, Andropov and Chernenko took up where Brezhnev left off and
Pravda condemned the "American policy of aggression" In Central America,
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especially Nicaragua. (Central American, Caribbean, Contadora Group, pp.
150-151)
Mexico showed its support for the Sandinistas in 1979 not
only through its foreign policy rhetoric but also by providing oil at
virtually no cost or with extremely easy credit terms. What is more
important to note than the original support for the FSLN Is how quickly
this support was withdrawn in the wake of the obvious communist Influence
and hegemonic aspirations of the Nicaraguans. Mexico, upon de la Madrid
assuming the presidency in 1982, attempted to remain low profile in its
support of Nicaragua. The new Mexican president stopped public
pronouncements in support of the revolution and curtailed visa privileges
for rebel groups. Mexico requested payment on oil shipments and by the
fall of 1983 the Sandinista government had to pay interest on loans
(Karl, 1986, 285). Communist influence in El Salvador Is no less a worry
to the Mex lean el I te.
b. El Salvador
About the same time the Sandinistas took power, indigenous
guerrillas in El Salvador began receiving logistical aid from the
Nicaraguan government. The principal method for supplying the guerrillas
was via a land route originating In Nicaragua and passing through
Honduras (Department of State, 1985, 34). The sea supply was
accomplished after dark by using boats powered by outboard motors. Small
planes supported the air routes by flying low-level, landing at Isolated
airstrips in El Salvador, or making air drops (Department of State,
1985, 34). These guerrillas tried to get the people of El Salvador to
ignore the democratic elections of 1982 that had come about as a result
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of a military overthrow of an authoritarian government in October 1979.
When persuasion did not work, the guerrillas responded with violence.
These military actions were extremely potent as support was received not
only from Nicaragua, but also Vietnam (U.S. made M-16s), Libya, and
Cuba.
Castro brought the various guerrilla factions from El
Salvador to Cuba shortly after General Romero was overthrown in 1979 and
convinced them unification was the only way to achieve their goals. This
was the beginning of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
and a parallel group, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR)
(Department of State, 1985, 32). The FDR, which united with the FMLN in
April, 1980, was made up of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats,
independents, peasants, and popular organization (Diskin, 1986, 58).
The initial goal of the FMLN was the destruction of the
democratic regime In power; to that end an "offensive" was launched in
January, 1981. The effort failed as the FMLN did not receive the support
of the Salvadoran people. A subsequent goal of the guerrillas then
became the destruction of the economic structure of the country. The
means to this end Included destruction of bridges, electrical generators,
and cash crops. Between 1980 and 1984, the guerrillas caused over $1
billion In damages (Department of State, 1985, 33). Besides destruction
of key economic Infrastructure, the FMLN use disinformation to topple the
Salvadoran government. This disinformation campaign was used to (1) win
the hearts and souls of the people and (2) sway opinion in the United
States against the ruling party.
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Mexico originally supported the FMLN-FDR, lending political
and logistical support. Mexico City recognized the guerrilla coalition,
through public pronouncements, as a legitimate opposition group; they
extended visas to the group with offers to visit Mexico for discussions.
As the government violence and death squad activity escalated, the
Mexican ambassador was withdrawn as a sign of support for the opposition
guerrillas. On 28 August, 1981, President Port I Mo sent a communique to
the United Nations, coauthored by Mltterand of France, which urged
recognition of the FMLN-FDR as "representative political forces."
Port i Mo tried to "facilitate an understanding among the representatives
of the opposing political forces In El Salvador with the aim of
reestablishing peace in the nation...." (Karl, 1986, 276) This had the
effect of granting legitimacy to the opposition while at the same time
calling for a peaceful settlement. However, by late 1982 and early 1983,
Mexico curbed public discussions of support for the FMLN and curbed visa
privileges. It can be argued the reason for Mexico's policy reversals in
the case of both Nicaragua and El Salvador was in large part the
financial crisis in late 1982 when Mexico ran out of foreign reserves.
The country turned inward in an attempt to stem the rising tide of
domestic unrest; foreign policy became a lower priority. Whether due to
increasing Marxist-Leninist influence in Central America and subsequent
elite concern, or debt repayment problems including increased U.S.
pressure for economic reform, the Mexican regime withdrew its support for
the government of Nicaragua and curbed its enthusiasm for the guerrillas
in El Salvador. Important however, Is the fact Mexico became actively
involved in the region due to a concern that the militarization
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of Central America threatened the "preservation of territorial integrity
and national sovereignty." (Karl, 1986, 274)
G. FINAL THOUGHTS: CHALLENGES TO THE MODERN MEXICAN STATE
Mexico faces challenges to its one-party system of rule and the
accompanying patronage system. However this is not something new or
unique. The regime, through six decades of growth has faced one or more
of the challenges listed above and responded each time. The key to the
longevity of the state has been Its flexibility. Some combination of
repression or cooptation has always turned away the challenge. But today
the situation is somewhat different; the regime is showing signs of
breaking under the strain. The strain is perhaps due to a critical mass
of these challenges; the signs of this strain are the topic of the next
part of the paper.
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IV. ALTERNATE SCENARIOS FOR TRANSITION AND THE DECLINE OF REGIMES
"The era of virtually only one party is ending, and we are
entering now a new political stage." (Aguilar, 1988, 0010) These words,
uttered by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, clearly signal a change in the
Mexican political system. That there will be some type of change In the
corporatist and authoritarian political structure of Mexico seems
undeniable. But what type of change will it be: structured or
revolutionary; dictatorship or democracy? What is best for the United
States? Washington clearly has an interest in this change as it has
close ties, both economic and social, with Mexico; changes in
authoritarian regimes with ties to the United States have not always
benefitted the U.S.
The 1973 military uprising which deposed Halle Selassie of Ethiopia
gave the Soviet Union great influence in the Horn of Africa. Coups In
Afghanistan in 1978 and 1979 again expanded soviet Influence, this time
in southwest Asia. Shilte fundamentalists overthrew the Shah of Iran In
1979; in the process they held American hostages for over 400 days,
hastened the demise of an American president, and started a bloody war
with Iraq which only in mid-1988 wound down. In the Western Hemisphere,
Nicaragua in 1979 provides a good example of a change in an authoritarian
regime unfavorable to the United States. It is obvious no whistles blow
or buzzers sound In some central control panel at the United Nations when
a country is about to make a change in government. But are there trip
wires or evidence of unrest which might give forewarning? Could these
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signs aid the United States in assuring a transition favorable to U.S.
nat iona I interests?
Many theories have been developed that attempt to predict or explain
transitions in government. Marxist theory emphasizes the conflict
between capital and labor. A modern adaptation of this concept to Latin
America has been the focus of the ruling regime on either equitable
distribution of wealth or high efficiency in production. Dependency
theory contends the reliance of "periphery" countries on those of the
"core" causes irregularities and distortions In the economies of the
periphery. These anomalies cause inequitable distribution of income and
foster violence and conflict in these countries on the exterior.
(Adelman, 1982, 593) Other theorists expand the variables to include
other than economic ones.
One of the theories encompassing more than economic factors is the
"rank disequilibrium" idea of political change. Different classes are
ranked as to their social, economic, and political status. Whenever the
relative position of a group or class is not the same on these three
different scales, attempts at change will be made to equalize the
rankings (Adelman, 1982, 595). Another theory proposes that the
stagnation of Import-Substituting Industrialization In a country causes
an educated and technocratic business class to fight for change. In
order to protect rising political and economic expectations, this
business class attempts to impose conservative policies conducive to
foreign investment and capital accumulation through an alliance with the
military leaders in the country. (Adelman, 1982, 594)
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All of the above theories highlight a plethora of variables to be
used when determining what type of change might take place when in wh i ch
country. The use of such variables in predicting specific changes In
individual countries at designated times seems to be of more value after
the fact than before the event occurs; hindsight Is 20-20. Of possible
value to U.S. policy makers with regards to Mexico Is a specific
checklist with predictive capabilities. A checklist has evolved out of
symposia held at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs at the U.S.
State Department. By applying this checklist to the specific case of
Mexico, it becomes apparent that change, be it evolution or revolution,
will take place. Some insights can also be gained into the type of
regime that will result and the implications for U.S. policy. The
following sections superimpose the basic checklist developed from the
symposia on the current situation in Mexico. (Blnnendljk, 1987, pp. 153-
164)
A. THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: A BASIC CHECKLIST
Authoritarian regimes go through a protracted period of unrest
lasting anywhere from five to ten years or perhaps even longer before a
change in leadership takes place. This unrest unfolds in three stages.
The first stage is initiated by a specific event usually easy to
identify; El Salvador elected Jose Napoleon Duarte as president in 1972
but he was not allowed to take office. Stage two marks the loss of
legitimacy of the government and is forewarned by a list of seven danger
signals; Argentina's ruling military government lost legitimacy along
with the Falkland Islands. The third stage is the last rapid decline;
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when the senior military leaders of the Marcos regime defected, Marcos'
time as ruler of the Philippines had come to an end. Mexico's
authoritarian regime has just entered the first stage of decline as
characterized by an easily recognized event. The event triggering the
decline was the presidential elections of 1988.
1 . Stage One: A Spec!
f
Ic, Eas I ly Recogn Izab le Event
Beginning with the 98 percent of the popular vote received by
Cardenas In the 1934 elections, no Mexican president had received less
than 70 percent support among voters. The largest percentage received by
an opposition group was Just under 16 percent; the total for the rest of
the opposition has not reached ten percent since 1952. The abstention
rate, having climbed to almost 40 percent in 1976 when the PR I ran
virtually unopposed, was approximately 30 percent in the 1982 elections.
The following table highlights election results from 1934 to 1982.
TABLE 9: ELECTION RESULTS 1934-1982
Year % votes for % votes for % votes for Turnout










15.7 9.4 68 .
2
(Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 438)
The presidential elections of 1988 marked a dramatic change In the











The apparent unity of the left shown by Cardenas and his National
Democratic Front and the continuing support for Clouthier, the candidate
for the PAN caused concern within the ranks of the PR I . A popular vote
total of 70 to 80 percent of the electorate would not be accepted as
legitimate by foreign observers or the general population. Yet a total
of only 50 to 60 percent of the popular vote would be politically
embarrassing to a regime that in large part bases its legitimacy on
receiving an overwhelming majority of the votes In any election. Also
possible was a loss of some of the 64 senate seats which before 1988 were
held only by members of the PR I . In the House of Deputies a complicated
voting system almost guarantees the PR I a majority of the 500 seats, but
large losses would be again politically embarrassing. The actual results
were far worse than the PR I had ever expected.
Out of the July 6th election came startling news. Salinas
received only 50.74 percent of the popular vote while Cardenas tallied
31.06 percent and Clouthier garnered 16.81 percent. Political analysts
believe that In a corruption-free election Salinas would probably still
have been the victor but with only 40 percent of the popular vote at
best. (Branigin, Mexican Congress Declares..., 1988) The PRI now holds
only a 262-238 majority in the House of Deputies; 137 of the opposition
seats are National Democratic Front and 101 are for the PAN. For the
first time In Mexico's history, 4 seats of the upper house went to the
opposition, specifically to the National Democratic Front (Herzfelder,
1988, 0052).
The PRI holds a majority In both the House and the Senate, and
Its candidate has been ratified by the Electoral College as the
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president of Mexico. Yet it Is clear that the presidential elections of
1988 were a break with the past. The decline of the current system of
Mexican corporatism has begun. It is not clear how long the decline will
last. In Iran it was nine years, In Haiti six, and In Argentina,
approximately eight. (Binnendijk, 1987, 154) The middle stage of the
decline In all these countries was characterized by a loss of legitimacy
for the government forewarned by a combination of any of seven variables.
2. Stage Two—Loss of Leg 1
1
Imacy : Poss Ible Ear ly Signs
Problems In a country do not always mean the overthrow of an
authoritarian system. As long as the country has control of both the
military and the economy, power can remain with the ruling political
elite (Binnendijk, 1987, 154). But once those who control these elements
of power no longer are the ruling elite (such as military or business
leaders), a quicker-paced period of decline is initiated. This period
usually lasts from 18-36 months and is evidenced by a combination of any
of the following seven variables.
a. Physical and Mental Health of the Leader
The Shah of Iran's cancer, Marcos' kidney problems, and
Somoza's heart attack all contributed to an appearance of weakness and
Indecision In the last days of rule for these men. A deterioration in
the physical and mental well-being of the ruler, or death, Is probably
the most important sign of decline In a regime and greatly contributes to
Its loss of legitimacy. (Binnendijk, 1987, 155)
Since 1928, Mexico has never had a president die In office or
resign his post for health reasons. Carlos Salinas de Gortarl Is
apparently In excellent health. An accomplished horseman, he enjoys
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tennis and runs three or four times a week. What makes the Mexican
system vulnerable is the lack of a clearcut successor should Salinas
become I I I or die in office. The apparent difficulty with which the
ruling elite rallied behind Salinas when picked by de la Madrid could
Indicate trouble In picking a replacement should he leave office early.
Conservative members of the party wanted an end to the picking of
tecnicos such as Port I Mo and de la Madrid whose fiscal policies had
hindered growth and whose political ideals had created openings for the
opposition. More reformist minded elites agreed with the choice of the
technocrat Salinas and saw It as a continuation of liberal economic
policies and fiscal austerity along with recognition of opposition
victories, at least at the local level.
b. Poor Management of Military Operations
Loss of legitimacy comes with an Inability to manage one of
the powerful tools of a country's power, the military. Under Marcos'
leadership, the communist Insurgents In the Philippines strengthened
their foothold; the Argentinian Junta lost most of what was left of its
credibility with the defeat in the battle with the British over the
Fa Ik lands. Although considered to be one of the least politically
motivated armies in Latin America, the Mexican political elite are very
aware of the need to support their armed forces. Instability in
Guatemala poses a threat to Mexican sovereignty. In Guatemala between
1966 and 1982, over 30,000 political dissidents died at the hands of
paramilitary death squads. This killing generated both guerrillas to
fight the death squads and emigrants to flee them. The guerrilla groups
responded to the repression of the death squads by fighting back,
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attacking not only the paramilitary squads but also government troops.
Much like the North Vietnamese pilots in China during the Vietnam war,
the guerrilla groups use southern Mexico, mainly the state of Chiapas as
a safe haven and a marshalling point for planning future attacks.
(Ronfeldt, 1985, 26) This warfare is of extreme concern to Mexico.
As outlined earlier in this thesis, Mexico has a history of
guerrilla uprisings in the southern part of the country. The military
did not decisively defeat this threat and does not want to see the
tensions rise again in the region. Repeated requests to enter sovereign
Mexican territory in pursuit of guerrillas, constantly denied by Mexico,
exacerbate the poor condition of government relations; some border
Incursions have been reported. (Ronfeldt, 1985, 26) Any military losses
by Mexico, most likely through Inept handling of a guerrilla threat to
Mexico City or the oil fields, could be seen as a lack of good leadership
from Mex ico City.
De la Madrid appointed several retired generals to top
civilian posts, and Included military contingents In parades where they
do not normally appear. He gave military modernization and expansion a
high priority despite budgetary restraint. On various occasions he
praised the military: once as the cornerstone of internal stability
during the period of uncertainty at the start of his term, and later as
the guardian of society. In 1983, he approved substantial pay Increases
for officers (Late I I , 1986, 29-30). The military is high on his priority




The third warning sign signalling loss of legitimacy Is
economic problems in the country. In every authoritarian regime studied
by the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, there was evidence of
economic problems. The famine In Ethiopia, negative growth rates in Iran
after sustained periods of growth, and over 100 percent Inflation in
Argentina all preceded a change in leadership. Rising expectations of
the nation during periods of accelerated growth turn to frustration and
anger during periods of decline.
By the beginning of 1988, Mexico experienced near negative
growth rates, over 150 percent Inflation, and a foreign debt that stood
at well over $100 billion. Payments on the foreign debt amount to
between 60 and 70 percent of the export revenues which severely restricts
potential growth. Near-term remedies would reduce the government sector
and do away with inefficient Industries: many jobs would be lost in a
country generating only half those It needs on an annual basis. Minimum
wage does not keep up with inflation and the middle class Is severely
taxed to support social programs. Mexico Is a country in economic
trouble.
d. Alienation of Leadership from the People
No government, not even an authoritarian one, can rule
without the support of at least some segments of society. The PRI's
traditional strongholds of support have been In the working classes and
the peasantry yet these sectors have been hit hardest by the economic
problems in the country. Although Fidel Velasquez, head of organized


















labor in line with the PR I , he warned in 1983, "Only out of discipline do
workers vote for the PR I . " (Carr, 1986, 5) The reason for labor's
discontent is outlined in the following table.
TABLE 10: REAL WAGES IN MEXICO CITY, 1976-1983
Year Nominal Real Changes Relative Consumer











e. Corruption and the Abuse of Power
Widespread corruption and the blatant abuse of influence and
position can contribute to the overthrow of a regime. Although not
Immediately a factor in a change of government, abuses in the Philippines
and Argentina gradually fomented discontent. Marcos' abuse of government
funds and his alleged involvement In the death of Corazon Aquino's
husband contributed to his downfall. The brutal torture and deaths
caused by groups supported by the military junta in Argentina were some
of the "straws" that broke the back of that military government.
Some corruption and abuse of power has In the past been
accepted In the Mexican political system. In 1976, President Echeverria
greatly devalued the peso Just before leaving office. In 1982, President
Port I Mo nationalized the nation's banking system. And again during the
term of de la Madrid, the peso was devalued significantly. A
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substantial percentage of ballots (generally about two percent) are
Invalidated each election due to "irregularities." Although apparently
not receiving the majority of support in the northern states, the PR I has
never lost a gubernatorial election. In a very matter-of-fact way,
political analyst Jorge Castafteda said "A Salinas administration would be
stronger if It came in with 52 percent or 53 percent of the vote than it
would with 60 percent or 70 percent." (Orme, 1988) President Salinas
himself confirmed the presence of election tampering when he said in an
address to the Congress In April, 1988 that the system of politics needed
to stop "obsolete and vice-ridden electoral practices." (Orme, 1988)
Although this type of pronouncement is not unique, (de la Madrid promised
to end government corruption during his administration), the apparent
passive toleration of corrupt government actions seems to have come to an
abrupt end.
During tho process of certifying the presidential elections
In August, 1988, opposition members of the Congress tried to examine the
millions of ballots being held in the Legislative Palace. They had to be
stopped by armed federal troops carrying automatic weapons. (Badillo,
1988, 0012) Opposition candidate Cardenas asked the Mexican Attorney
General's office to bring charges against Interior Minister and Election
Commissioner, Manuel Bartlett Diaz and his secretary Fernando Ellas
Calles for "hiding information on the electoral results." More than a
week after presidential election, results had not been released from over
24,000 polling places (Anderson, 1988, 0348)
In perhaps two of the greatest demonstrations of the lack of
toleration for corrupt practices In Mexico, chaos broke out during
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President de la Madrid's last state of the union address to his country
on September 1, 1988, and during the inauguration of his successor on
December 1 of the same year. Members of the opposition rushed to the
podium during de la Madrid's speech and ripped up both copies of the
Constitution and a special finding written by PR I members that certified
Carlos Salinas as the clear winner of a fraud-free election. Opposition
members staged a walkout and carried with them supposed burned and
Invalidated ballots. De la Madrid was constantly bombarded throughout
his three hour speech with catcalls and shouts of "Fraud", "Traitor", and
"Get out, Judas" from the Democratic Front. Additionally, the president
of the Front was kicked and hit In the back of the neck by two PR I
governors. (Herzfelder, 1988, 0052) During the Inauguration of Salinas,
authorities had to remove 200-300 protesters by bus from the front of the
Legislative Palace. Protesters had thrown rocks at the building while
shouting "Death to Salinas!" and "The death of democracy." Cardenas
called the Inauguration the consummation of an Illegitimate presidency
(Snow, 1988, 2134). Mexico clearly presents evidence of the fifth
warning sign of a loss of leadership legitimacy and a period of rapid
dec I Ine.
f. Opposition Coalitions
A sixth warning sign of an Impending loss of legitimacy for a
regime Is a union of heretofore fractious and divisive opposition
parties. Although perhaps not permanent coalitions, these groups unite
Just long enough to replace the ruling political elite. As with a number
of the other warning signs, this pattern was evident In Iran, Argentina,
the Philippines, and Haiti.
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Before the 1988 presidential elections in Mexico the
political left had presented at best fractured opposition to the PR I
.
The PSUM was the closest approximation to a united front against the
ruling party. The National Democratic Front coalition changed all
perceptions of the Left. Lorenzo Meyer, a political analyst, said of
Cardenas and his coalition, "A year or so ago you could have written off
the left, but the Cardenas candidacy has completely changed that." Meyer
feels the Left's message of less government and less big business has
struck a responsive chord in many Mexicans. While It remains to be seen
If the Cardenas Front will remain a political force after Its surprise
showing in the July 1988 elections, the results seem to Indicate more
than a large no vote for the PR I .
Cardenas has not disappeared from the Mexican political scene
or been neglected by the International media. The son of the former
president stated he will transform his Democratic Front coalition into an
official party and ask for recognition from the government some time
after an organization meeting in February, 1989 (Snow, 1988, 2134). He
recently gave an interview to the Overseas Development Council, a private
organization dealing with third world problems. The American press
covered the discussions and cable companies in the U.S. broadcast the
exchange. The Salinas administration felt it necessary to invite heads
of state to the December presidential Inauguration ceremonies in an
attempt to legitimize a close and, according to Cardenas and Clouthler,
fraud-ridden election. This was the first time In the history of the PR I
that foreign leaders have attended such a ceremony In Mexico. Cardenas
takes himself seriously, the International press considers him Important
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enough to devote newsprint to, and Salinas considers him enough of a
threat to change the inauguration format. Perhaps most interesting to
note is that in a country where there are three viable political parties
competing in an election decided by direct vote, 34 percent is all that
is needed for victory. Cardenas received 31 percent after a hastily put
together campaign with little financing or national exposure. Like his
father before him, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas and his National Democratic Front
are likely to have a great impact on the Mexican political system.
g. Military Divergence from Elite Ideals
The final warning signal when assessing whether a regime Is
losing its legitimacy is a lessening of support from the military. When
faced with choices and situations that could undermine the Institution,
such as an economic crisis or unpopular orders for handling of civilians
within their own country, professional militaries often react to preserve
their way of life. Chile's overthrow of a leftist (although elected)
government and the armed forces' reaction to economic crisis In Brazil
are Just two of the many examples to be found In Latin America.
Ironically, one of the events precipitating the strengthening
and modernization of the Mexican military was the Tlatelolco
confrontation with student demonstrators in 1968. In a move to enhance
Its image and strengthen Its forces the push began for force
modernization and education. (Ronfeldt, 1984, 1) Although specific
details are not known, it appears the military is taking on a more
Integral role in the managing of the Mexican state. Even though
supporting the government through the accomplishment of various roles,
top officers are being trained for the possible necessity of replacing
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civilian leadership if needed. (Ronfeidt, 1985, 11) Any sign, though
none Is as yet evident, of a lessening of support for the government
could be a sign of major changes in leadership.
This concludes a discussion of the warning signs associated
with the second stage of decline In a regime: the government's loss of
legitimacy. Combining this with the already discussed stage one and the
following discussion on the final transition, a graphic representation
can be constructed of the checklist used to track a changing Mexico.
Stage 1
:
A Spec I f ic, Eas I ly Recogn Izab le Event
- 1988 Presidential Elections
Stage 2: Loss of Leg i t Imacy
- Physical and Mental Health of the Leader
- Poor Management of Military Operations
- Economic Malaise
- Alienation of Leadership from the People
- Corruption and the Abuse of Power
- Opposition Parties
- Military Divergence from Elite Ideals
Stage 3: The F ina I Trans 1
1
Ion
- Nature or Type of Transition
- Past History of Democracy
- Structures Necessary to Support a Democracy
- Abilities of the New Leaders
Figure 2: The Decline of Mexican Authoritarianism: A Checklist
The following section discusses the third stage of transition and how
different elements will affect the type of regime that emerges.
3. The F Ina I Transl t Ions of Author I tar Ian Regimes
Mexico is in stage one of a transition from an authoritarian form
of government. There are many signs of stage-two warning signals which
would Indicate a loss of legitimacy for the ruling body and Initiate a
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rapid deterioration of the present government. The question of Interest
for the United States is not if the ruling body will change, this seems
to be a foregone conclusion, but Into what type of ruling body the
country will evolve. Will I t be a democracy, a dictatorship, a more open
form of corporatism, or something else? There are four variables, the
analysis of which will help determine the future political direction for
Mexico. They are (1) the nature of the downfall of the current
government: violent or controlled, (2) a past history of democracy or a
supporting country with that inclination, (3) the Institutional
structures necessary to support a democracy, and (4) the abilities of the
new leaders (Binnendijk, 1987, pp. 159-160). These four variables are
explored in the following sections.
a. The Nature or Type of Transition
The ways in which a leader can give up power vary from the
violent to the controlled. Logically, the more serious the extent of
change, the greater the chance for a violent upheaval. During radical
change, often revolutionary and uncontrollable, moderates are removed
from positions of power In a blood-letting that destroys all existing
political and military institutions. Often politically inept, the new
leadership is extremely Ideological and can be stridently ant l-Amer lean,
especially If the previous government supported U.S. policies. A less
extreme version of this revolutionary change preserves some of the old
political and military Institutions, often using military support to
uphold the change In government. This new leadership Is more pragmatic
with more political experience and much less of the Ideological zeal
characterizing the previous type of transition. Its seems unlikely
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Mexico will experience a violent or radical change In government. Elite
and peasant alike do not want to revisit the carnage of the 1910
revolut ion.
Another type of transition Is a military coup; this does not
seem probable in Mexico. The dominant political entity prior to a coup
Is usually the military and this is not the case for Mexico. A fourth
and final type of change is one In which the authoritarian leaders
themselves Initiate the process of transition. (Chalmers, 1986, pp. 390-
395) Interested In developing the economy and Improving society, key
military or civilian leaders start a liberalization process. Often this
liberalization is a result of the highly skilled and professional middle
class. In the case of radical revolutionary change or a military coup,
democracy seldom prevails. So too the foreign policy Interests of the
United States are not furthered. However, Washington has met with some
success when social and political institutions of the old regime are at
least partially preserved, making for an orderly transition. This would
be the case when (1) revolutionary leadership moderates Its ideological
fervor as in the second example or (2) the authoritarian leadership
itself initiates the change, as In the fourth example (Binnendijk, 1987,
pp. 157-158). Another key determinant of regime type, besides type of
transition, Is whether or not the country has a past history of
democracy.
b. A Past History of Substantive Democracy
If a country has a political history which legitimates the
government through, consent of the masses, a belief that no one person is
permanently superior to any other, and a great respect for the opinions
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and worth of the individual, a democratic regime is more likely after
transition for an authoritarian regime. This is to say the emphasis in
society is on (1) the individual and his attempts to satisfy self-
interests and (2) the limitation of government to ensure the liberty and
rights of the population as a group. Thomas Jefferson once said
government should be
...a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from
Injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their
own pursuits of Industry and improvement, and shall not take from the
mouth of labor the bread It has earned. This Is the sum of good
government, and this Is necessary to close the circle of our
felicities. (Malone, 1970, 22)
In this society, competing elites are positioned and removed
from office through competitive elections. To this end it Is Important
that control of the government by one group of elites does not negate the
Interests of the opposition nor permanently negate the possibilities of
that opposition from assuming the reigns of power. These competing
elites realize they have mutual Interests that could not be furthered by
civil war or anarchy. This type of society, and the values contained
within, are not part of Mexico's political heritage.
Mexico does not have a history of democracy. Although the
sexenios vary in their inc lusl veness and openness, all have been
authoritarian and corporatist. Mexico has been ruled through
presidential decisions Influenced, but not controlled, by Interest groups
not Individuals. The corporatist system operates more on the basis of
one dollar - one vote and respects the opinions of the group, not the
Individual. The opposition elites forever remain the opposition, with no
chance of assuming power, at least at the national level.
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In addition to having a history of substantive democracy, the
support and backing of a powerful ally with a democratic tradition aids
In any transition to democracy. This ally Is used as a role model and an
example of the benefits of this type of government. In format and
theory, the structure of Mexican government Is patterned after the United
States. There Is a Senate, a House of Representatives (called a Chamber
of Deputies) an executive branch, and a Judiciary. There are popular
elections with the results ratified by an electoral college (a committee
made up of members of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate). Yet the
similarities end there and In practice Mexico does not look to the U.S.
as its role model. Although Mexico and the United States are allies, and
the U.S. provides much needed economic support, the history of conflict,
envy, and at times even hatred between the two countries precludes Mexico
from using Washington as an example of a country to emulate. Not only
does Mexico not have a history of democracy or a supportive role model,
neither does it have the necessary Institutions to support a post-
transition democracy.
c. Structures Necessary to Support a Democracy
To develop a post-authoritarian democracy, countries not only
are aided by a history of democracy but also by a firm foundation from
which to rebuild It. This foundation consists of those institutions,
groups, and ideals which facilitate and foster a democratic environment.
Important group structures aiding In democracy building, or rebuilding,
Include a viable opposition, free press, competitive elections, and a
growing and politically aware middle class.
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Formally, many of these Institutions are in place in various
Latin American countries and have been for 100 years. There are three
reasons for this (Peeler, 1985, 23). First, during the initial phase of
the Independence movement In Latin America (approximately 1820), many
elites believed liberal democracies were the best type of government.
Writing a constitution to reflect the accompanying Institutions
associated with these democracies was one way to orient the newly
Independent states in that direction. Secondly, these same elites
realized the necessity to at least look democratic In order to have their
Independence respected by their northern neighbor and Europe. Lastly, by
encouraging the participation of the masses In the political process,
these elites legitimized, to the masses themselves, the existing
pol 1 1 ica I system.
Mexico, like most of Latin America, In theory Includes these
liberal Institutions In the political system but in reality excludes
these same Institutions from valid participation, especially the
opposition, the middle class, and the press. Opposition parties, like
competing companies In a free market economy, are supposed to keep the
"quality" of the political product high while keeping the "price" low.
Before the Mexican presidential elections of 1988, a vote for an
opposition party was as much a protest against the PR I as a voicing of
support for the opposition party itself. Perhaps for the first time in
1988, the vote for the opposition, especially for the National Democratic
Front of Cardenas, was truly a show of support.
The support shown by the middle class for any administration
Is often used as a measure of the success or failure of that regime. In
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many governments the middle class is supportive of the ruling body and
must be considered during any economic or social change in the country.
(Chalmers, 1986, 394) In Mexico, the peasants and laborers have
traditionally been the pillars of support for the PR I , not the middle
class. This middle class has suffered much in Mexico and has probably
benefited least from the Economic Solidarity Pact and other austerity
measures.
Besides the Institutions and groups, ideas can also be
powerful allies of democracy. The Idea of a free and unbiased press
spreads the word of the government in power as well as that of the
opposition. The citizenry becomes informed and can thereby make
Intelligent choices concerning leadership In their respective countries;
election by popular vote becomes a credible way to choose a president.
Although the political reforms in the 1970's gave opposition parties
better access to television, radio, and newspapers, Journalism Is still
controlled by the regime. This control of the Journalistic media gives a
tremendous advantage to the PR I during any election.
d. Abilities of the New Leaders
The building and maintenance of a democracy takes more
political savvy and skill than that required for some type of strict
authoritarian regime. While the latter rules by force, the former rules
by reason and compromise. If an authoritarian regime Is ruled with
strong military support it can be quite stable. It Is for this reason
the U.S. has supported these types of regimes in Latin America.
Democracies, In their Infancy, tend to be unstable; the success rate of
long-term democracies in Latin America Is not good. For this reason,
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the leaders of any new democracy need to be skilled in the art of
politics. In every example of liberal democracy in Latin America
(Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Colombia) there has been skillful negotiation
among rival elites leading to a "peace treaty" or pact which laid the
foundation for a democratic state. (Peeler, 1985, 137)
In Colombia, elites In the Liberal and Conservative parties
established a mechanism called the National Front In 1957 which aided in
a transition to democracy completed in 1974. Key actors In these
intricate negotiations included the Catholic Church, the military, and
Important business leaders. In Venezuela, not two but three political
parties had to agree to disagree and In 1957 formed a coalition that
accepted the elected president as leader of the country. Again Involved
In the decision were the church, the armed forces, and military leaders.
As In the previous two cases, Costa Rica's Initial transition to
democracy in 1948 involved accommodation among competing elites, the
business community, and the military forces. None of the above three
transitions would have taken place without sk I I I ful negotiating by
experienced politicians.
Mexico's opposition parties, although never before a viable
alternative to the PR I , have been seedbeds for political activity where
candidates gain experience and a constituency. Within the PR I itself,
some of the elite, frustrated by an Inability to push through reforms,
broke free from the party to form splinter groups of their own. Cardenas
Is but one very Important example: being a former governor and member of
the PR I he probably has the savvy and know how to run the country. His
experience within the PR I as a governor of the state of Mlchoacan would
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greatly benefit the negotiation process between rival elites. He is
surely as experienced In government as de la Madrid or Salinas, neither
of whom had been elected to any political office prior to the presidency,
e. Concluding Thoughts: The Final Transitions
In determining the political direction Mexico will take as a
result of its transition, four factors need to be considered:
1. the type of transition; violent or controlled;
2. the history of democracy In the country;
3. the necessary building blocks for democracy, and;
4. strong leadership to nurture a democracy.
Mexico will most likely experience a controlled change in its
political structure. This change can only be accomplished by experienced
politicians skilled in the art of negotiation. It then follows that this
new leadership will have to come from opposition leaders who have
participated In the political process, or from disaffected elites within
the PR I Itself, as in the case of Cardenas. In Mexico, there is no
history of democracy or democratic institutions. Since at least the days
of Porflrio Diaz, Mexicans have lived under authoritarian rule. Although
the United States is probably the most copied democracy In the world,
Mexico does not emulate its northern neighbor. Finally, Mexico has
strong political figures in the country. When the change does come, the
new leaders will be experienced politicians, not wild-eyed
revolutionaries. The question now becomes, what type of transition will
Mexico experience and what will the final "product" look like?
Key players in changes to a regime Include at a minimum the
ruling elites, the military, and the middle class, often represented by
business entrepreneurs. Also Important is the leftist opposition. In
-90-
the three examples of liberal democracies, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and
Colombia, the leftist opposition was excluded from the decisionmaking
process during discussions on regime transition. In at least the case of
Venezuela, these leaders had to be repressed as unsatisfied demands
boiled over into public demonstrations. In the following sections,
alternative transition types are presented Involving the previously
Identified key players: political elite, military, middle class and
business sector, and leftist opposition. The actions of these key
players are a function of the four factors determining Mexico's political
direction: type of transition, history of democracy, Institutions for
democracy, and quality of leadership.
B. TRANSITION AND CHANGE: WHAT WILL MEXICO BECOME?
In determining what Mexico will become, It might be helpful to look
at what It is not. Mexico Is not ruled by a military Junta or strongly
Influenced by the same. However, the military becomes a more modern and
professional force every year. Some type of military takeover then Is
poss ible.
The political system in Mexico has lasted almost 60 years.
Throughout the decades, the ruling regime has used some combination of
repression and co-optation to maintain control. As new business leaders
or labor unions emerge, they are co-opted. As student uprisings or
Indigenous terrorist movements Increase, they are repressed. Mexico
currently relies on the patronage system. In the past financed by oil, to
allocate benefits. As this source "dries up", due to continued low
prices for oil and Increasing reliance on non-oil exports, Mexico will
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have to control by other means. The continuation of an authoritarian
regime relying ever more on repression as a means of control is possible.
Mexico is not a Marxist-Leninist regime. However, in 1981 the
PCM Joined with four other parties and established the United Socialist
Party of Mexico; this created the strongest socialist party since the
heyday of the PCM in the 1930's. Blue collar workers, under the thumb of
their aging leader Velasquez, show signs of discontent as they continue
to suffer under the anti-inflation plan run by de la Madrid and authored
by Salinas. A revolution of the proletariat is possible.
Mexico Is not a democracy where one man - one vote and opposition
parties offer viable alternatives to the regime In power. However,
reforms in the 1970's facilitated the rise of opposition parties.
Cardenas and his National Democratic Front stress dignity of the
individual and received more support In the 1988 presidential elections
than any opposition party has ever garnered In the history of modern
Mexico. Opposition victories in the Chamber of Deputies deprive the PR I
of a two-thirds majority for the first time in its history. Democracy is
possible. The following sections explore the four possibilities.
1
.
Mill tary Intervent Ion
Any type of transition in Mexico will Involve the military in one
way or another. The armed forces could support the existing government
in any efforts to Increase repression through crowd control, arrests of
dissidents, Imposition of martial law, closing down of the press, or
other strong-arm tactics. Another role could be that of a caretaker,
supervising a transition of power and eventually turning control over to
a civilian body. It is also possible a ruling military junta could
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remain In power. Given the apolitical nature of the Mexican military,
the first two roles are feasible, the last is possible, but highly
Improbable.
The military's current desire to leave governing of the country
to civilian elites Is based on the latter's ability to govern effectively
and an assumption that it Is and will continue to do so. Greater
military involvement In the government, be It as an adviser within the
system or as a transition facilitator outside of the system, becomes more
likely as current economic and political stresses become greater and the
government falters. Stated in another manner, "The military mind... may
be able to tolerate many things, but It can never accept nor understand
disorder." (Ackroyd, 1982, 18) Additionally, major changes in the
military Increase the likelihood of intervention as the armed forces
become Increasing more confident In their ability to govern. These
changes In hardware and training were motivated by steadily broadening
definitions of national defense needs In the 1970s after, as noted above,
huge oil deposits were found in the south, revolutionary unrest surfaced
In Central America, and the ruling elite recognized a need for the
military as a support group. (Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 449) Support
has taken the form of armed repression, counter Insurgency campaigns, and
private assurances.
Demonstrators in Mexico City have been repressed by soldiers
using tanks, helicopters, and machine guns. The military went after
numerous terrorist groups and rural guerrillas during the 1960s and
1970s. Most recently, heavily armed soldiers maintained order during a
confrontation between government officials and opposition
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representatives; the representatives tried to break into a room
containing election ballots from the July 1988 presidential elections
(Badillo, 1988, 0012). Private assurances from the armed forces
bolstered sagging administrations during times of duress, (as In June,
1971, when the newly inaugurated Luis Echeverrla was challenged by a
conservative coalition of Industrialists and politicians led by the mayor
of Mexico City). (Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 448-449)
Through the higher level of education and training offered by the
new professional military schools, the armed forces are gaining the
ability to participate In both Internal decisions determining the
direction of the country and external foreign policy decisions.
The Mexican military is for a strong central government; a strong
government In Mexico can co-opt and repress as necessary to control
mobilization and appease demands. Seventy percent of the officer corps
was recruited from Mexico City or 11 central states; few are from the
North, the center of power for the conservative opposition. (Late I I
,
1986, pp. 29-30) Nevertheless, the armed forces are probably Just as
disillusioned as the business and opposition political elites with the
failures of civilian leaders In the last decade to end corruption, stop
massive abuses of power, and halt the slide of the Mexican economy Into
an ever growing foreign debt hole. It seems likely the prestige and
political adroitness of the military will continue to develop in the
years ahead. The military forces will gain confidence In their ability
to run the country.
A military-dominated government would be likely In the event that
political and social instability rise to dangerously high levels.
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A suggested example of this level of political instability is that
experienced as a result of presidential elections of July, 1988. This
type of conflict could cause splits among conservative and liberal
political elites within the PRI.
Serious elite conflict between the conservatives and reformers
could result In a political standoff. The strong beliefs of each group
could make compromise Impossible. Precisely at this point, the existence
of a potentially mobilizable mass of discontented people would become of
paramount Importance. The more progressive elites (convinced that their
opportunity for putting through basic reforms was limited ) might decide
to take advantage of the potential for mass mobilization In order to
Increase the chances of implementing their reforms. Attempts at mass
mobilization by the progressive elites would cause the more conservative
elites to secure their position by mobilizing their supporters. The
result would be the transformation of the Mexican political system Into a
competitive populist regime characterized by elite conflict and high
levels of mobilization. This could provoke a takeover by a Mexican
military whose short-term goal would be restoring order. The outcome
could be a mixed civilian-military regime. Civilian career politicians
or technocrats might still have the upper hand in such a coalition, but
the military would undoubtedly have greater influence than they currently
exercise on nonmilitary policy making. Although this scenario is
possible, there are at least three reasons why the military might not
intervene In the political arena.
-95-
a. Reasons Supporting Military Non-intervention
The first element directly effecting the military is the
revolution of 1910. Officers believe their social revolution and
resulting system of one-party government Is unique. The revolution of
1910 Is the center upon which the ideals of the military revolve around.
"Universal military values. ..are given a peculiarly Mexican flavor, by
associating them with glorious episodes In the nation's and the army's
past." (McAllster, 1970, 230) Deriving their mission directly from the
1917 constitution, the armed forces are tasked to defend the
constitution, maintain the sovereignty of their country, and preserve
Internal order. Until the unrest In Central America and the discovery of
major oil deposits in the southern part of the country, Internal order
has been the primary concern of the Mexican military (Wager, 1984, 89).
Secondly, the military institution has not traditionally been
the court of last resort In modern Mexico. Unlike the majority of Latin
American countries, the ruling civilian regime Is the ultimate guarantor
of hegemony, not the military (Needier, 1987, 207). During the
presidency of Cardenas, a ministry of National Defense and a Ministry of
the Navy were created. Under this command structure, the army and air
force came under the National Defense Ministry while the Navy was of
course controlled by the Navy Ministry. This chain of command, in effect
today, prevents any one military person from holding power over all three
services. Unique In Latin America, this structure effectively dilutes
and disperses the power of the top military leaders. Cardenas also
started the practice of rotating military zonal commanders every few
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years so no power bases or personal followings could be built. (Wager,
1984, 90)
Lastly, the military seems to be suffering less from the
system's general decline in legitimacy and power than civilian elites
(Late I I , 1986, 30). Unlike present day Chile and the Argentine military
of the early 1980's, the Mexican armed forces have not been blamed for
the economic and social problems of the country. For this reason, the
military way of life has not been threatened by dissension,
disagreements, or splits along Ideological or foreign policy lines.
Thus, the military is unlikely to Intervene in the political affairs of
the nat ion.
b. U.S. Influence and Weapons Transfers
Mexico maintains a military free of entangling alliances with
other countries; the armed forces maintain their distance from the U.S.,
in part to maintain credibility with the third world (Wager, 1984, 100).
Mexico refused to sign a defense pact In 1951 with Washington and did not
participate in the ouster of Cuba from the Organization of American
States (OAS) In the early 1960s. In the last four decades only Costa
Rica, Haiti, and Panama received less military aid from the United States
than Mexico (Schoultz, 1981, 215). Only Mexico and Cuba have not had a
U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) within their borders
since the 1960's (Schoultz, 1981, 238). Military relations between the
two countries have "remained cord la I .. .but .. .more symbolic than
substantive." (Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972, pp. 1-
24)
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Mexico's emphasis on Internal security instead of external
threat, an indigenous arms production capability, and a non-
interventionist foreign policy, reduce dependence on any one foreign
power for large quantities of weapons. Mexico has a small defense
Industry but one that has been in operation since the turn of the
century. Following WWII, most military equipment in the Mexican
Inventory consisted of old U.S. equipment. Within 20 years, equipment
was coming from both Europe and Israel. Since this time, no one country
has a monopoly on sales to Mexico.
TABLE 12: VALUE OF ARMS TRANSFERS TO MEXICO
CUMULATIVE 1976-1985 BY MAJOR SUPPLIER













(World Military Expenditures, 1986, 119)
Mexico develops and produces rifles and smaller handguns. A
Mauser rifle, compatible with U.S. equipment, was developed In 1954:
7000 were Issued to the armed forces. An Improved version of the B-1933
light machine gun (RM-2) was developed as well as the Mendoze submachine
gun. (English, 1984, 310) An arms producer In West Germany, Hechler and
Koch, has a contract with Mexico and has supplied G-3 assault rifles:
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semi-automatic weapons firing 600 rounds per minute. Mexico arranged for
production of these rifles; by late 1983, a production line assembled
parts imported from West Germany. In 1984, the parts were made in
Mexican machine shops with Germans supervising Mexican workers. Although
M-3 and M-5 light tanks are made in the U.S., Mexico does have the
capability to repair some tank parts and produce others (Alisky, 1984,
pp. 248-249). The regime purchased 115 armored cars from the U.S. in
the past decade (1973-1983). In 1971, French AMX APCs were being made in
Argentina; Mexico sent observers there who then recommended to the
Defense Minister that a West German firm be asked to bid and a contract
was later finalized for Henschel Corporation's HWK-11S. West Germany
made deliveries in 1973 and by 1981 Mexico was able to manufacture some
of the parts and integrate them with the major parts from West Germany.
They are now assembled In Mexico (Alisky, 1984, 256).
Shipbuilding is relatively underdeveloped, although some
small patrol and auxiliary craft were built from the 1940s onward. A
number of small patrol boats were built in local shipyards beginning In
1959-1960 with the 80-ton Azueta and Vlllapando built at Tamplco. In
1972, Mexico produced the Azteca class 130-ton patrol boats partly In the
U.K. and partly In Mexico. (English, 1984, pp. 315-316) As for ship
repairs and modifications, the Ministry of Communications and
Transportation (Secretarla de Comun lead ones y Transportes, or SCT) has a
Submlnlstry for Ports and Merchant Marine. The SCT and the Navy Ministry
coordinate their needs for drydocks, cranes, warehouses, and similar
necessities of shipbuilding and repair through the director of Ports and
the Merchant Marine. In November, 1981, a new Olmeca patrol boat was
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commissioned; it was constructed at the Navy Ministry. Advances in
electronics and guided missiles and Mexico's desire to make Its small
navy more effective, have put pressure on the government to manufacture
radar equipment and parts for anti-ship missiles. Subcontracts for
equipment now under production in Mexico City, Monterrey, and Guadalajara
plants assure the availability of needed parts for the Navy as it
upgrades its electronic defenses. (All sky, 1984, 253)
The aircraft Industry, although never large, carried out much
pioneering work during the first quarter of the century and kept up a
steady stream of production Into the 1960s. Local aircraft production
Included 40 Lockheed-Azcarate LASA-60 general purpose aircraft during the
1950s and early 1960s of which 18 were purchased by the Mexican Air Force
(English, 1984, 319). Although helicopters are imported, some of the
parts can be made domestically or repaired, such as Type-E rotor blades.
Monterrey and Mexico City electronics firms produce oscilloscopes for
radar screens. Mounts and connections for laser trackers are locally
available In Mexico. The corporation Turbo Jet de Mexico (TJM) of Mexico
City manufactures and Imports aircraft engines, Instruments, and fuselage
parts for aircraft ranging from Bell helicopters to Pratt and Whitney
light-plane engines (Alisky, 1984, 252-254).
Civilian policy makers are committed to armament production
and Imports at a modest level of replacement plus some small annual
Increments for Increasingly sophisticated weaponry (Alisky, 1984, 252).
In recent years, the bulk of Mexico's defense spending has gone for
personnel, equipment operation and maintenance, and maneuvers and
training. Capital outlays represented relatively small percentages of
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the total defense budget before the 1970s. In the 1980s, however,
weaponry has become more complex, surveillance systems more
sophisticated, and costs Inflated. During the 1980's, arms purchases
have been increasing by ten percent a year; military manufacturing of
ammunition and arms Inside Mexico is growing by 12 to 15 percent a year.
Arms procurement planning is much Improved; earlier, supply officers had
no plans for follow-on support after purchases of major weapons systems.
This greatly diminished the effectiveness of the system. Since 1982, the
buy has Involved "total system transfers and follow-up support."
(Al Isky, 1984, 257)
c. Final Thoughts: Military Intervention
Military participation in support of government objectives,
like the quelling of the student riot In 1968 Is possible as social
unrest continues to grow. Even an interim military Junta presiding over
a transition In government could be seen but not permanent military rule.
The armed forces, although participating In government decisions at a
national level, simply do not yet have the expertise or desire to govern.
Because of a determined effort to avoid military treaties and extensive
arms purchases from any one country, this desire not to govern will be
based on Internal decisions and not external pressure.
One result of both defense treaties and weapons purchases is
a state of dependency. In the former It Is dependency upon the ally to
supply some of the defense of the country. In this way a country
effectively Increases the size of its army without Increasing the
military budget; however a country's military goals might not be
maximized In deference to its ally. In the latter, technology and
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maintenance requirements often cause a weapons purchaser to require
assistance from the seller for years. This dependence can compromise
foreign policy objectives as the buyer supports foreign policy decisions
of the seller to keep the spare parts and trained technicians flowing
into the country. One has only to look at the Iranian Air Force to see
what the lack of assistance from the supplier (The U.S.) can do. Mexico
helps to maintain its autonomy by avoiding substantive military contact
with the U.S. and by both diversifying Its weapons suppliers and
developing an indigenous arms production capability.
2. Ma Intenance of the Current Regime
Scholars have been predicting the demise of the Mexican
corporatist system since the 1950's. They have alternately said It Is In
crisis, under threat of an Imminent coup, or on the verge of Impending
collapse. Is it, or should one heed the thoughts of Martin Needier when
he says,
Are the crossroads really there or are they a mirage produced as
the blurred eyes of Mexico-watchers peer across the arid wastes of
commentary into the hot air of political rhetoric? (Needier, 1987,
201)
This next scenario examines how the Mexican regime is able to resist the
strains on its system and adapt Its political structure or repress its
people as needed.
In this scenario, the state doesn't relinquish its control over
society or simply fade into obscurity. It must however, rely
Increasingly upon coercion and co-optatlon to maintain control as the
economy falters and demands for political reforms become louder. The
regime recently weathered a 1988 presidential election that clearly
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weakened the legitimacy of the state due to an abstention rate of over
50 percent, militant resistance by the opposition to fraud, and extensive
foreign media attention (Aguilar, 1988, 0010). One possible reaction to
this situation could be suspension of electoral contests at the state and
local levels until economic and political conditions are more favorable
for a return to "democracy." (Cornelius, 1987, 36) Tighter controls
could be put on the mass media; selective crackdowns could be ordered on
universities, dissident unions, and other organized opposition groups
(Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 463). The PAN and the Cardenist Front will
continue their attacks on the legitimacy of the regime; the danger of
destabilizing splits within the ruling elite will increase. Although
possible, co-optatlon and selective repression reduce the likelihood of a
military coup or other violent upheaval.
a. Co-optatlon In the Guise of Reform
One example of such a reform might be the abolition of the
right of amparo: a right used mainly by landowners to delay for
approximately 20 years the transfer of their lands to peasants to whom
the government has granted title. Another possibility would be the
nationalization of privately owned lands in federal irrigation districts,
as such lands are among the richest in the nation and the vast quantities
of money that the government has invested In them have benefited wealthy
private agriculturalists almost exclusively. Still a third example would
be a restructuring of the tax system to, eliminate the Issuance of stocks
made out only to the bearer, (a system that makes it Impossible for the
government to control foreign penetration of the economy or to determine
the amount of wealth owned by stockholding Mexicans), Increase taxes on
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agriculture, (which at present Is taxed at only nominal rates), and tax
capital-derived Income at rates equal to those applied to Income derived
from labor. The above reforms would tend to neutralize any potential
mass mobilization on the part of peasants. (Purcell, 1977, 181) Other
co-optatlon In the guise of reform Is the already Implemented
restructuring of the one-party corporatlst system In order to open up the
pol 1 1 lea I process.
b. Reform of the One-Party System
Over the past 25 years, the regime has Instituted a number of
political changes under the guise of reform. Party system reforms In
1963 and 1973 covered three aspects. First, the voting age was lowered
from 21 to 18; the minimum age requirement to run for congress was also
reduced. Second, the ruling political elite eased requirements for
registering parties for national elections. (Bailey, 1987, 76) Pursued
during the presidency of Echeverria, there was an opening to tne left,
the apertura democratlca. This involved release of political prisoners
Jailed during the repression of 1968, the Incorporation of former
political dissidents into the state administrations, attempts to
accentuate the third world features of Mexican foreign policy, and an
effort to tighten links between the PR I and the social-democratic
Socialist International (Carr, 1986, 4-5). The third party reform made
It easier for parties to win seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
The thrust of the 1977 electoral reforms, referred to as
LOPPE (Ley Federal de Organlzaciones Pol It leas y Procesos Electorales)
was promotion of opposition parties. The 1977 reforms provided first
that parties might qualify to run candidates by registering 65,000
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members In states or electoral districts; alternatively, they might seek
provisional registration, and if they received at least 1.5 percent of
the vote in the subsequent national election, their registration would be
made permanent (unless future votes dropped below the minimum). The
second provision of the 1977 reforms Increased the Chamber of Deputies
from 250 to 400 seats (later expanded to 500 seats); 100 of the 400 seats
were reserved for opposition parties, to be won through election by
proportional representation from party lists In the five districts into
which the whole of the country was divided. The other seats are filled
by simple majority elections In the 300 electoral districts, but If any
party wins as many as 60 of the 300-seat bloc, It may not compete In the
proportional representation contest for an additional share of those 200
seats. The third element of L0PPE allowed opposition parties to receive
free access to radio and television, postal facilities and telegraph
lines, as well as subsidies for certain monthly publications and tax
exemptions. One final provision of the reforms was the guarantee that
permanently registered parties be granted voting membership on the
Federal Electoral Commission (CFE) and state and district commissions;
provisionally registered parties could send observers. The Federal
Commission Is the ultimate arbiter of charges of fraudulent practices in
the tabulation of electoral returns (Stevens, 1987, 227).
Besides Increased voter participation, a subsequent goal of
the reforms was to stimulate growth of the Left to establish some balance
with the PAN (Bailey, 1987, 77). This element of the 1977 reforms
significantly increased the democratic appearance of the 1982 elections
and was a result partly of the 1976 elections where the Communist Party
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wasn't legally registered and the PAN didn't run a presidential candidate
because of internal divisions. The change represented by the 1977 law
was symbolically important, because it laid the foundation for the
subsequent 1979 registration of the communists and several other parties
to the left of the PR I for the first time since the presidency of
Cardenas. (Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 442) Although not official acts
such as the LOPPE In 1977, electoral reform continued in Mexico during
the de la Madrid administration.
In December, 1982, opposition groups took over town halls
throughout the central region of the country; they were protesting
against fraudulent municipal elections. The newly installed de la Madrid
administration responded in a low-key, non-repressive manner. The
president ordered negotiations with the dissidents rather than the
traditional method of dealing with such situations (sending In army
troops or federal police to Impose a PR l-control led municipal
governments). The PRI conceded defeat, at the municipal level, In seven
major cities. Five of these (Hermoslllo, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato,
Chihuahua, and Durango) are state capitals, and another Is a large border
town (Ciudad Juarez). De la Madrid saw this as a necessary risk for the
regime; It created an outlet for popular frustrations and the ambitions
of dissident politicians, at a time when the regime had few material
benefits to distribute. Controlled liberalization of the political
system from the bottom up also avoids or postpones major confrontations
between reformers and conservatives within the regime Itself. Further
the PRl's control of the truly important public offices (the presidency
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and the state governorships) wasn't challenged by the liberalization
po I icy.
In 1983, de la Madrid recognized an unprecedented number of
victories by opposition parties at the municipal level, including several
major cities; however, the Idea of open primaries for local elections was
still seen as politically radical in Mexico. Conservative elites within
the regime feared such a step might lead to a further, and potentially
unstoppable, unraveling of Mexico's system of centralized political
control (Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 426). This refusal to use primaries,
although clearly only one among a number of factors, accounts partially
for the exit of Cardenas from the PR I
.
c. Outcomes of the Party Reforms
The effects of the party reforms became noticeable for the
first time in the 1979 federal elections for members of the national
Chamber of Deputies. The pre-reform period of 1961-1976 Included only
four parties: the PAN, PR I , PPS, and PARM. During that period the PR I
slipped from 90.2 percent of the total votes to 80.1 percent. In the
same period the PAN rose from 7.6 percent to 14.7 percent and then fell
to 8.5 percent in 1976. Over the next three elections (1979, 1982, 1985)
participation rose to include five additional parties. They Include: the
PSUM, the PRT (Partido Revoluclonar lo de los Trabajadores) , the PMT
(Partido Mexicano de los Trabajadores), the PDM (Partido Democrata
Mexlcano), and the PST (Partido Social Ista de Trabajadores) (Horcasltas,
1987, 19). Analysis of the popular vote revealed further slippage in
support for the PR I from 69.7 percent In 1979 to 65 percent In 1985; the
PRI actually received 3,021,009 fewer votes In 1985 than In 1982 and lost
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ten deputies. In that same period the PAN increased its percentage from
10.8 (1979) to 15.5 in 1985 (Stevens, 1987, 226-227).
On the surface these results look like a positive response to
the electoral changes instituted by the political elite. Although
retaining the majority of the (1) seats in the Chamber of Deputies and
(2) popular vote, the PRI's domination of the system was clearly waning.
Critics would have a difficult time arguing that Mexico had a one-party
system. Yet a deeper probe into the election results tell quite another
story.
One of the goals of the PRI's change in the political system
was a strengthening of the opposition parties, particularly the left, to
strengthen the electoral process as a legitimizing tool for the regime.
An analysis of the 1985 election for the Chamber of Deputies shows a
marked decline In support for the two major opposition parties: the PAN
and the PSUM on the left. On the other hand, the parties closely
affiliated with the PR I showed real gains. In the elections, the PAN
received 999,210 votes less than In 1982 (a 1.9 percent drop) and lost
ten seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The PSUM received 353,381 fewer
votes (a 1.2 percent drop) and lost five seats. As a group, the parties
closely associated with the PR I gained 13 seats In the Chamber and
received 45,848 more votes (a 1 percent gain) than in 1982 (Horcasltas,
1987, 19).
The form which the Intention to give greater representation
to opposition parties took was that of a restructuring of the Chamber of
Deputies. As mentioned earlier, the number of seats was Increased from
250 to 500 with 200 of these seats reserved for minority parties. The
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winners of the 200 seats are determined by a second ballot cast by voters
in the single-member, winner-take-all district elections. This second
ballot Is a list of party representatives chosen from one of five nation-
wide electoral regions, created specifically to determine winners of the
200 minority seats. Seats based on the results of this second ballot are
distributed proportionally, within some limits, among parties which have
won fewer than sixty district seats, that is, parties other than the PR I
.
However, proportionality is not characteristic of the total distribution
of seats In the Chamber. Arbitrarily, only 200 out of 500 seats are
reserved to be distributed in accordance with the results on the second
half of the ballot. Arbitrarily also, not all of those seats are In fact
distributed proportionately, since each registered party receives a
minimum of one seat out of that number per electoral district.
For example, there were seven parties beside the PR I in the
1985 federal elections. Assuming each Is registered in the five
electoral districts, 35 of the 200 minority seats would be automatically
decided without any voting. Each party would receive 2.5 percent of the
seats even if they received less than 2.5 percent of the vote (1.5
percent is required to maintain permanent registration). This has the
effect of strengthening tiny micro-parties at the expense of any larger
parties more likely to approach the status of genuine threat to the PRI.
The plurality single-member district elections by which 300 of the 500
seats are filled translate anything over a plurality of the votes, given
more than one opposition party, Into an overwhelming majority of the
assembly seats. For example, assuming at least two strong contenders in
the district voting (the PAN and National Democratic Front), the PRI
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could garner only 35 to 45 percent of the votes and still win 300 seats
In the Chamber out of a possible 500. The stipulation that a party
winning over 60 seats in district elections does not share In the
proportional distribution of the 200 extra seats clearly Indicates the
expectation that the system will continue to be one of a single dominant
party in effective control of the legislature, with a minority of seats
earmarked as a concession to small parties In permanent opposition. The
provision that parties gaining over 60 seats do not share In the
proportional distribution of the vote on the second half of the ballot
also means that the PR I sustains no loss If It Instructs Its voters to
opt for Insignificant micro-parties on the second ballot, especially
micro-parties willing to collaborate with the PR I , thus giving them seats
at the expense of the larger, more serious, opposition parties (PAN,
National Democratic Front, and PSUM). (Needier, 1987, 209)
The political changes, in themselves, did little to reduce
the absolute power of the PR I and increase democratization within the
system. The changes were for the most part an attempt to co-opt and
Incorporate the opposition and channel the dissatisfaction with the
regime in a direction agreeable to the ruling elite. There remains some
"give" in the system; the PR I can easily accept opposition victories for
two or three governorships, which would rightly be regarded as a major
breakthrough for the forces of opposition. Yet the dominant single-party
system would continue at the national level principally unaffected,
d. Final Thoughts: Maintenance of the Current Regime
Mexico's experience shows that changes within the electoral
system which serve mainly to create additional space within the political
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arena for opposition parties do not really promote the democratization of
the system. And the more competitive elections made possible by
liberalized election laws do not even necessarily help to legitimate the
government, so long as the basic authoritarian features of the system
(the PR I itself and the mass organizations) remain Intact. (Cornelius,
1987, 33) The political liberalization process, as a method of
co-optatlon, has reached a dead end. Reformers are restricted from
Instituting state-financed changes due to the ever-worsening economic
crisis and fear that further liberalization is likely to benefit only
their enemies: big business, the Church, the PAN, the Cardenas Front, and
other opposition parties. Leftist factions within the PR I are concerned
with minimizing the effects of the economic crisis on their labor,
middle-class, and professional constituencies. The rightist opposition
demands democratic transformation, but few Mexicans take It seriously as
an alternative to the PR I ; the more milltantly it protests PR I electoral
abuses the more It seems to strengthen the hand of those within the
regime who oppose political reforms. (Cornelius, 1987, 35) The Cardenas
Front demands fraud-free elections and an end to PR I domination; It is
perhaps the first valid challenge to existing political power since the
Incept ion of the PR I
.
The political openings of 1977 and 1982-83 were Intended to
stabilize an Increasingly antiquated political machine. They have had
the opposite effect for three reasons. First, by sanctioning more
opposition parties, PR I leaders undermine one of the central themes of
the 1910 revolution; they have shown the party cannot be all things to
all Mexicans. By raising popular expectations for a more genuinely
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democratic system, the PR I has given more of a reason for popular
mobilization. Second, legalized opposition parties can evolve over time
Into broader coalitions of anti-PRI groups. The Cardenas Front is a
combination of leftist parties, many of which were illegal before the
1977 political reforms. Lastly, the PR I must ever Increasingly perform
In elections as a real political party: that is to nominate appealing
candidates, develop platforms and agendas, wage competitive campaigns,
and respond to voter Interests and complaints, rather than to function
merely as the political front of the system (Late I I , 1986, 16-17).
3. Trans 1 1 Ion to a Marx Ist-Lenlnlst Regime
To speak of a Marxist-Leninist government In power in Mexico is
to speak of the spread of Soviet Influence and satellite countries In
Latin America. Although there are some who would say a Marx Ist-Lenlnlst
state is not necessarily a soviet satellite (Ottaway, 1986, 11), In Latin
America the evidence points to the contrary. Cuba is clearly Marxist-
Leninist and a Soviet proxy. Although at times disagreeing with the
Moscow line, Havana for the most part supports and furthers Soviet goals
In Latin America. Nicaragua Is clearly Marxist-Leninist. On June 23,
1981, Humberto Ortega, one of the leaders of the Sandinlsta movement said
In a speech to a group of Sandinlsta army officers:
...we are Inspired by sandlnlsmo, . . .we are guided by the scientific
doctrine of the revolution, by Marxism-Leninism. We were saying that
Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our
revolut ion. . .wl thout sandlnlsmo we cannot be Marxist-Leninists, and
sandlnlsmo without Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolutionary.
(Christian, 1986, 222)
That Nicaragua Is already a Soviet satellite Is not clear.
Managua will probably remain outside the Soviet orbit unless two things
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happen. (1) U.S. pressure for change becomes too restrictive on
Nicaraguan policies and; (2) the Soviets can provide the economic support
afforded Cuba. That one of these two conditions will be met seems
certain. Which one is best answered by U.S. policy experts.
In this thesis it Is assumed that any attempts, by the Mexican
government, to Increase Marxist-Leninist, or communist influence equates
to an attempt to Increase Soviet influence. Equally as Important,
foreign policy objectives In support of Soviet policies highlight
elements In the Mexican government sympathetic to the Soviet cause.
Although not probable, there are those within the Mexican government who
would support a communist government.
a. Why Communists Would Like Greater Influence In Mexico
In looking at Soviet chances for Influence in Latin America
and specifically Mexico, some analysts believe progressive, reformist
forces are becoming stronger every year. This view pits the economic
nationalism of Mexico against the control of U.S. multinational
corporations. The Soviets would like to exploit this antagonism to
further three objectives In the country. (1) Greater control over
strategic raw materials. The Soviets do not believe they could cut off
the flow of essential raw materials to the United States but any change
of trade patterns vis-a-vis the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would be a favorable
change In the Soviet "correlation of forces." Valuable resources
possessed by Mexico include oil, Iron ore, and uranium. (2) Furtherance
of nationalist movements. In the case of Mexico, this second objective
Is directly tied to the first. The nationalism of Mexico Is economic and
Is directed at the industrialized countries, specifically the United
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States. Mexico wants debt relief from a massive burden of over $100
billion. Any shifting of trade patterns, debt-repayment slowdown or even
default would benefit the Soviets. (3) Improvement In relations with
countries with which the U.S. has strained or deteriorating relations.
As outlined In this thesis, problems over immigration, the debt issue,
and drugs trouble U.S. /Mexican relations. (Duncan, 1981, pp. 5-12)
Moscow does not have to look far to highlight existing differences
between Washington and Mexico City.
b. Mexico's Links to Communism and Opposition to U.S. Policy
Mexico, through its foreign policy objectives, shows there Is
a progressive elite who would support increased communist Influence, or
at least are in agreement with the policies thereof. In 1954, Mexico
opposed U.S. action against the Arbenz government In Guatemala. In
1962, Mexico stood alone in Latin America In maintaining relations with
Cuba. Mexico City supported the Al lende government In Chile and opposed
Washington's destab i I I zat ion policies in that country. In 1975, Mexico
voted in the UN to equate Zionism with racism and voted against the U.S.
in support of a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. Mexico neither supported
the sending of an Inter-American Peacekeeping force to Nicaragua by the
OAS nor the promotion of free elections In El Salvador in 1982: the
leftist insurgents were seen as a representative political entity.
They did support a dialogue between then Secretary of State
Alexander Haig and Rafael Rodriguez, the Vicepremier Minister of Cuba.
President Port I Mo supported and helped co-author the Contadora peace
initiative which called for a peaceful settlement In Central America
without U.S. Interference. Port i I lo also visited Moscow In May 1978 and
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signed an agreement to further cultural, sports, educational, and social
science pursuits. Founded in 1979, the PR I used the Permanent Conference
of Latin American Political Parties (COPPPAL) to support the Sandinistas
and other "socialist, ant l-lmper la I 1st , or revolutionary parties, and the
opposition forces in other Central American countries." (Grabendorf f
,
1984, 88) Economically, Mexico also belongs to groups which support
communist regimes and exclude the United States such as the CMEA, SELA,
and an oil support group. These examples of both political and economic
foreign policy choices show at the very least a sympathetic view of
communism for a lengthy period of time among a large number of the
Mexican political elite.
According to Mexican Marxist-Leninists, a transition to a
communist form of government would most likely take place by means of the
established election process and not through some dramatic social
upheaval; communists in Mexico do not support the two-stage theory of
revolution with its Inevitable violent clash of classes. Neither did it
support Moscow during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia or the 1979
Invasion of Afghanistan. In 1979, it officially participated in
elections for the first time since 1946. In November, 1981, the PCM
combined with four other parties to form the PSUM, thereby giving up Its
claim to be the "sole interpreter of revolutionary Marxism In Mexico."
(Carr, 1985, 1) The next section looks at Mexican communism, Its support
among the population, and Its chances to govern the nation.
c. Mexican Communism
Communism In Mexico has never enjoyed nationwide appeal.
Support for the PCM and Its communist tenets has vacillated between 5000
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and 60000 members; support by and for Its "natural" constituency, the
working class and peasants, has always been weak (Carr, 1985, 7). There
are three reasons for this. First, until 1968, the PCM argued that
Mexico was in a feudal and pre-capitalist state. It argued that
capitalism needed to be fully developed before socialism could take
place. It followed then, that needs of the capitalist factory owners and
Industrialists were promoted instead of those of the workers. Secondly,
labor has been under the thumb of the PRI, who could offer greater
concrete benefits in the present, through Fidel Velasquez, than could the
PCM with its vague promises for a "workers revolution" In the future.
Finally, until the early 1950's, the PCM was so much In agreement with
the "revolutionary" Ideals of the PRI that It entertained the Idea of
dissolving and becoming an official sector of the corporatist government.
The PCM revitalized Itself In 1968.
The bloody repression of the student movement in 1968
alienated many of the progressive elite In the PRI who felt the party no
longer stood for the goals of the revolution. After 1968 the PCM picked
up support from these dissatisfied elite, along with that of students and
other intellectuals, all of whom believed in the Ideals and proposed
political policies of the PCM. These included:
1. more state control over foreign Investment;
2. control of exchange rates;
3. lessening dependence on the U.S. as a trading partner and source of
funds •,
4. entry Into OPEC;
5. nationalization of pharmaceuticals and food processing;
6. massive tax reform;
7. nationalization of bank lending;
8. adoption of a nationwide plan for redistribution of wealth;
9. abolishment of wage controls;
10. keeping wage Increases In line with Inflation;
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11. price controls for primary goods, and;
12. increased spending on government programs for social welfare.
Additionally, unions of university teachers and workers
established in the mld-1970's gave their support to the PCM. It Is in
these unions, most often separate from the PRI, the PCM and the communist
movement as a whole place primary emphasis.
Mexican communism believes In the independence of trade
unions. Independence that Is under the leadership of the communist
party. This is a prerequisite for a successful transition to a socialist
state. Very simply then, the goal of the communist movement in Mexico is
not to talk of the Ideological struggle between the workers and the
owners but to develop policies that will secure the freedom of the labor
unions from the PRI. (Carr, 1985, 15) What then are the chances the
communists can wrest control of the union movement from the PRI, initiate
the changes to socialism, and Implement Its policies as delineated above?
In the near term, they are slim to none.
d. Chances for a Mexican Communist State
The Mexican communist movement bases its future success on
Independent and democratic trade unions. That is Independent from the
ruling regime and the CTM. This will not happen as long as labor Is tied
to the ruling regime through Fidel Velasquez, a staunch ant i-commun ist
who has controlled the official labor sector for more than 40 years.
Velasquez is a pragmatlst who believes In the Ideals of the
1910 revolution and looks to long term goals instead of short term gains.
He stands committed to the Institutions and ideals of the revolution,
most specifically the PRI. As mentioned earlier, he is opposed to
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leftist movements; due partly to this, he does not believe in national
mobilization or strikes to solve state/labor problems. It is true he has
threatened action against the state as a result of economic austerity
measures. Yet Velasquez has settled for Inter-el Ite bargaining and
company to company negotiations In lieu of nationwide mobilization.
(Middlebrook, 1988) Although the Economic Solidarity Pact Instituted by
de la Madrid to control Inflation hits the workers especially hard,
Velasquez supports it as long as when stability returns, concessions will
be made to the workers.
It is unclear at this point how Salinas will deal with the
labor sector. The new president has called into question the traditional
pact between labor and the state (Middlebrook, 1988). Further, the
chances of Velasquez relinquishing power become greater every year; he is
over 80 years old. There are no chosen successors and a more progressive
leader could step in. Most likely, the PR I will back a replacement who
is just as ant i -communist and pro-PRI as Velasquez. And the fact remains
that during perhaps the worst economic crisis ever faced by Mexico, a
crisis in which the hardest hit sectors have been the labor and middle
class, the communist movement could not draw labor away from the ruling
regime. More independent trade unions are appearing every year, but as
quickly as they form, the important groups are co-opted Into the
corporatlst regime. Co-optation and repression are tools used
extensively by the Mexican regime to retain power. Some say these tools
will allow the PR I to repair any cracks or breaks In the corporatlst
"house."
-118-
e. Final Thoughts: Transition to a Marx Ist-Len Inlst Regime
A Marxist-Leninist regime in Mexico will not happen. The
Mexican communist movement receives minimal support at best. Its natural
constituency, labor, is controlled by the CTM and there are no signs that
this will change. Communist factions necessarily tread carefully as they
are ever aware that any sudden leftward movement of Mexico could elicit a
negative reaction from the United States. This reaction could be
anything from diplomatic pressure to military intervention depending on
both the foreign policy of the new Mexican government and the perceived
threat to U.S. vital Interests.
4. Trans 1 1 Ion to a Substant I ve Democracy
There are many definitions of a substantive democracy. One
divides this democracy into two parts: (1) the avoidance of a closed
group of political elites which allows everyone a chance to be elected
and (2) decentralization of authority to increase the Influence of public
opinion (Casanova, 1970, 179). Another gives the system three elements:
(1) universal suffrage, (2) national candidates elected in races offering
more than one candidate, and (3) freedom to Join political parties and
interest groups to try and influence political opinion (Peeler, 1985, 5).
For the purposes of this paper, the definition of a substantive democracy
Is even more comprehensive. To be a viable, working democracy, a country
must meet the following eight requirements:
1. freedom to organize and Join groups;
2. freedom of speech;
3. universal suffrage;
4. eligibility to hold public office;
5. the right of political leaders to seek public support;
6. more than one source of official Information-,
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7. fair elections, and;
8. dependence of government institutions on voter preference.
(Lijphart, 1984, 2)
The Mexican regime considers itself democratic but not as defined
In this paper. According to President de la Madrid,
Democracy [Is] understood, not in Its strict political and much
less electoral sense, but rather as It Is defined In Article Three of
the Constitution which we revolutionaries wrote Into the fundamental
text and which defines [democracy] not just as a Juridical regime and a
political system, but rather as a sense of life that seeks the constant
economic, social, and cultural betterment of the people. Democracy Is
not measured only In votes but rather has been measured In Mexico by
the broadening of social Justice to a growing number of Mexicans.
(Bai ley, 1987, 64)
It is a failure to provide "the broadening of social justice to a growing
number of Mexicans" that has unbalanced the current regime.
Since 1929, the primary stabilizing and legitimizing mechanisms
for the ruling Mexican regime has been Its corporatlst system of rule.
The system has been facilitated by first a traditional populist spoils
system, and in the 1970's an oil-based patronage system. Today, oil
exports no longer provide enough money to support the patronage system.
Today, this one-party form of government is not functioning as either a
stabilizing or legitimizing mechanism for the political elite. It has
lost much of Its credibility and mass support. The government must
somehow solve the problem of how to maintain control of the corporatlst
structure through an adjusted form of co-optatlon and repression without
driving the opposition out of the system.
Prior to this decade, the PR I assumed government could function
only within a closed system of Internal consensus; If strong opposition
parties ever developed, there would be violence. In the Mexico of today,
there are ever strengthening opposition forces; if control cannot be
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maintained through some new sort of co-optation, such as the electoral
reforms In the late 1960's and 1970's, then the state will have to devise
a new mechanism; many reformist elites believe free and fair elections
within a democratic form of government are the only possible answer.
The economic crisis, (over 100 billion In foreign debt, Inflation
over 156 percent for 1987) and recent political embarrassment for the
PR I
,
(only 50.7 percent of the popular vote in the 1988 presidential
elections) may give Mexico's progressive political elite an opportunity
to open up the system in ways unthinkable only a few years ago. In the
view of this progressive elite, both within and outside of the official
party, the political process must offer a meaningful outlet for the
tensions and frustrations generated by economic austerity measures. In
the last three sexenlos, the government failed to efficiently allocate
resources or resolve societal conflict (conflict between itself and the
society). The populism of Echeverrla did not redistribute land or
wealth; Port II to and de la Madrid did not successfully transform massive
oil wealth Into a higher standard of living for the majority of Mexicans.
There has also been what some authors call "a crisis of representation."
(Nassif, 1988, pp. 7-10)
Since the revolution, the PR I has been the voice, through a
corporatist system, of both the elites and the workers. However, In the
last decade the country has become Increasingly pluralistic and
urbanized. Many prefer practical reform to the rhetoric of the
revolution. With this preference for practicality has come an emphasis
on conservative goals more so than liberal or progressive ones. Economic
conditions shattered the dreams of many of Mexico's elite, especially
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those in big business. Promises of social progress, a better life, and
redistribution of wealth have similarly been unfulfilled for millions of
blue collar workers and peasants. The social pact made between the
governing regime and society during the time of Lazaro Cardenas no longer
Is considered valid; no where was this more evident than during the de la
Madrid administration. To protect the manufacturing sectors as well as
current employment rates, de la Madrid eliminated subsidies on major
foodstuffs and raised prices on many staples. The result of the
austerity measures of the 1982-1988 sexenio was a reduction by more than
half of the buying power of the Mexican worker.
This Invalidation of the social pact by the PR I has given
movements such as Panismo and Cardenlsmo added strength in various
regions of the country. The PAN, with Its emphasis on decentralization
of government and the fight against election fraud and corruption is
increasing gaining strength in areas such as Chihuahua, Baja California,
Sonora, Nuevo Leon, Durango, and Coahulla. Emphasizing social Justice,
elimination of corruption in state agencies, and a return to the social
contract of the revolution, the modern Cardenlstas also show increases in
power and influence. (Nassif, 1988, pp. 12-14)
Men like Cuauhtemoc Cardenas argue that state-society
relationships In Mexico are "fossilized, dysfunctional, and in need of
replacement, in the Interests of system survival." (Cornelius and Craig,
1984, 463) Some Mexican academics and Journalists predict a gradual
distancing of the state from society, as the state's credibility,
legitimacy, and capacity for co-optation and Incorporation become
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weakened. The government will continue to officially rule the country
but civil society will go Its own way, no longer relying upon the
government to distribute the wealth of the nation or act as ultimate
arbiter In societal conflicts. (Cornelius, 1987, 36) According to
reformist groups, the current political system should undergo a slow but
steady liberalization, changing from one of PR I domination to genuine,
multi-party competition, at least at the local and state levels.
Opposition party victories at those levels should be recognized wherever
they occur (especially in the northern border states). The PR I spoils
system should be eliminated by replacing Its traditional agents for
control at the local level (caciques, old-style labor bosses) with a new
generation of political powerbrokers. (Cornelius and Craig, 1984, 463)
These local bosses of the PR I rely on patr Imonla I Ism, cllentelism,
repression and electoral fraud In many cases to keep the candidates of
their party In power. Zones where these tactics are especially prevalent
Include Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi, Morelos, Jalisco, and
Mlchoacan.
If a real, substantive democracy Is to flourish In Mexico, it
must spring first from the local and regional level, and then spread
across the nation. Democracy cannot be mandated from above, it must rise
from below. In a democracy, individuals act collectively or alone to
Influence public policy; this means the orders come from "below", not
from above. The regional movements are forcing the regime to change.
Perhaps one of the best Indications of the efficacy and strength of these
regional movements is their success without the support of the PRI.
Traditionally, the PRI has not responded to suggestions from below
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instead initiating co-optation from above. Unlike the political
"openings" of the 1960's and 1970's, the PR I did not initiate the current
regional pockets of power. These regional groups realize they do not
have the wherewithal or support to win a presidential election.
Likewise, the PR I realizes it can maintain control over the presidency
but is finding it increasing difficult to control municipal and even
state elections with its ever dwindling supply of resources. Perhaps
echoing the desires of a reformist elite, 1988 election returns and
economic downturns are bringing some of their Ideas to fruition. In the
state of Veracruz the opposition took 15 mayorships from the PR I
;
opposition spokesmen claimed victory In more than 20 races. In 1985 the
PR I ran virtually unopposed in all 203 races In Veracruz and lost only
five races. In 1988, opposition candidates ran in 177 races In Veracruz
(Mexico-Election, 0355). Opposition candidates are Justly excited about
these victories and feel that:
In the electoral field, the government, its party and everything
they represent-corrupt ion, ant I democracy , delivery of the nation to
foreigners, violence and assassination-have been defeated.
(Branigln, Mexican Denounces, 1988)
Although democracy must start In Mexico at the regional and
municipal level, this liberalization of society brings with It no
guarantee that the regime will quietly acquiesce. Instead of
decentralizing power and liberalizing the state apparatus, the regional
movements, at least in the short term, have actually had the opposite
effect upon the Mexican regime. (Foweraker, 1988, pp. 6-25)
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a. How the PR I Has Responded to Regional Movements
The regional movements affect the regime In the way it reacts
to both the opposition and the masses (Foweraker, 1988, 1-18). Groups
outside of the three official corporatist sectors of the regime, (CNOP,
CNC, and CTM) , represent increasingly large portions of the population.
In the past, the state has co-opted these groups, bringing them "Into the
fold." Increasingly, these Interest groups are being Ignored or violently
repressed. This reverses a trend of co-optatlon first, then repression
as needed. Additionally, redistribution of wealth (through land) was
abandoned as a goal of the de la Madrid administration.
A goal of the opposition elite Is the replacement of the
local caciques and strongmen of the PR I . This is being accomplished, but
not In a way imagined by this elite. The regime Is removing local bosses
and replacing them with central state agencies more closely tied to
Mexico City. State agrarian groups such as the CONPA, SRA, and SARH have
replaced local caciques and tied the peasants more strongly to the CNC.
Food related state agencies such as CONASUPO, INMECAFE, and TABAMEX are
also more active now on a regional and local level. These state agencies
now carry out much of the co-optatlon and repression previously handled
by local bosses.
Replacement of the caciques by the government has caused a
rift and power struggle between the two groups as both renegotiate and
review their positions. Further complicating the situation Is the fact
that these local caciques are often already tied to certain state
Institutions which have now lost their local "points of contact."
Further, the replacement by the federal government Is slanted In favor of
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supporting more fully the CNOP and the middle classes. These are often
the most sought after groups by the regional movements. These problems
In centralization highlight weaknesses In the PR I organization.
Often the regional level of PR I organization considers itself
an entity unto Itself and not part of a larger central organization.
This often makes directives from the state somewhat slow to filter down
to lower levels of organization; the directives can be watered down or
changed by the time they reach these levels. The Increasing
repress ion 1st directives of the PRI, largely in response to the regional
movements and subsequent mobilization, gradually pull support away from
the state party. This lack of support can be shown in votes for
opposition parties (the regional movements).
The regional movements have caused the regime to reevaluate
its control over society. This reevaluatlon has prompted a more
exclusionary system of co-optatlon, replacement of local strongmen with
central government figures, and an increasingly represslonist attitude.
In other words, the regional movements caused the PRI to reorganize; this
reorganization produced an awareness of the Inadequacies of
representation and conflict resolution capability at the local and
regional levels. One way to solve this problem is to further liberalize
the process and allow popular choice of local representation. However,
another solution would be to strengthen PRI representation and mediation
methods at this same level.
b. Final Thoughts: Transition to a Substantive Democracy
A real change towards a substantive democracy in Mexico would
require at least three conditions. (Meyer, 1988) First, there would
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have to be a change in the way candidates are selected for the presidency
by the PRI. Opposition parties have suggested a primary as in the United
States. This would force candidates to develop a constituency and
following. Next, the PRI would have to be separated from the government
and considered just another political party. As the system works today,
the PRI receives an unfair advantage in both spending capability and
control of the media. Finally, opposition victories at all levels would
have to be recognized and accepted. This would include governorships and
even the presidency. The Mexican presidential elections of 1988
signalled the beginning of some type of change in the current system.
This change quite possibly could be a democratic opening. There are
already signs the conditions listed above are starting to appear (Smith,
1988).
Before 1988, candidate selection was wrapped In secrecy. At
best there was an announcement, always Informally, of a list of possible
candidates. All of these "possibilities" held cabinet posts and
represented mainstream regime thinking. After possibly consulting with
some political leaders, the outgoing president picked a successor who was
rubberstamped by the PRI. The campaign and election of the candidate
were but a formality. In 1988, the candidates were known almost two
years before the election. Each candidate represented different themes,
I.e., Salinas (Economics), Manuel Bartlett Diaz (Law), Alfredo del Mazo
Gonzalez (Labor), and Garcia Ramirez (Moral renovation). These
precandldatos were formally Introduced by Jorge de la Vega Domlnguez, the
president of the PRI, In August of 1987. The campaigns are no longer
Just a formality; they are a legitimating tool for the candidate and the
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political process. The Issues discussed during these campaigns are now
more far reaching and profound.
The recognition of opposition victories has already been
discussed at length in this paper. Although these victories have been
only at the municipal and mayoral level, It Is a start. During the term
of de la Madrid, the recognition of governors from a party other than the
PR I was up for discussion a number of times. Hardliners, those who
believe the PR I must win everything, every time, prevailed. Yet with the
election of Salinas, another tecnico, the subject is sure to surface
again. Salinas, like de la Madrid, would be more likely to accept a few
gubernatorial races won by the PAN or the National Democratic Front.
It is hard to imagine the PRI ever becoming separate from the
Mexican regime. However there are signs that this mouthpiece of the
state has had to revitalize itself and show Itself to be the voice of the
revolutionary ideals inscribed in the 1917 constitution. The replacement
of Jesus Silva-Herzog with de la Vega was seen as a step to strengthen
the PRI (Smith, 1988)
.
Of the four possibilities presented In this thesis, a
democratic opening and move toward a substantive democracy seems most
likely to occur over the next 20 years. This does not mean a dramatic
lurch toward liberalization. It does not mean the PAN or National
Democratic Front will place their candidate at the head of government In
Mexico City. It does not mean a party other than the PRI will gain a
majority In the Senate or Chamber of Deputies. Yet It does Indicate
change.
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First, elections will increasing become fraud free as
national and international attention is drawn toward the changing Mexican
situation. This change will bring with It more opposition victories at
the municipal and mayoral level. Also probable are gubernatorial
victories by the PAN or National Democratic Front, especially in the
northern states. Secondly, the press will gradually become less a tool
of the regime and more a source of mass Information. The opposition will
gain more access to the public through the press and other communications
media and thereby become national movements Instead of regional parties.
This should increase voter turnout and reduce the abstention rate.
Finally, there will be more national organizations formed outside of the
corporatist sectors of the PRl. As when a monopoly Is forced to allow
competitors Into the market, this will have the effect of making the PRl
improve Its "product" to attract "buyers." The opening in Mexico has
begun. It will be slow, but it will not be stopped.
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V. CONCLUSION
The first stage of change In the Mexican corporatist system has been
Initiated and second stage signs are evident. It will be an extremely
slow process, much more so than the 15-20 year time frames experienced In
countries such as the Philippines or Iran. The U.S. should play a
supportive role in this process: not one of unilateral intervention but
of bilateral participation.
A. U.S. PARTICIPATION
The United States will lend support to the Mexican administration in
the Salinas sexenlo not Initially to foment democracy but to prop up a
sagging neighbor. The national Interest of the United States Is in a
stable Mexico, not a democratic one. Any actions by Washington to
support a changing Mexico should be made with this in mind. The new Bush
administration will take some steps to help stabilize our southern
neighbor primarily to prevent a collapse in the economy. It appears the
interaction will be more cordial than during the Reagan administration.
Bush has made Mexico one of his top priorities and said that relations
between the two countries are "as Important as our relations with the
Soviet Union." (Branigin, U.S. Mexican Presidents-Elect, 1988) Salinas
aides feel future meetings between the two men will be more cordial than
between de la Madrid and Reagan and add privately that "Bush likes Mexico
and knows the country and its culture and Its problems." (Herzfelder,
1988, 0119) Although an unstable Mexico with worsening economic and
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social situations made the democratic opening possible, a stabilization
aided by the U.S. will not shut the door.
The patronage system of Mexico, as documented in this thesis, Is
based upon oil and has been since Its discovery in 1976. If the price of
oil continues to drop, the ability to finance the apportionment of
rewards lessens. President de la Madrid's term has been dubbed "the
sexenlo of zeros" because of a lack of success in breathing life back
Into a sagging economy. He did however accomplish two things Important
to a discussion of the oil-based patronage system: the diversification of
exports and the selling of government-owned businesses to the private
sector
.
During his sexenlo, de la Madrid gradually tore down 40 years worth
of protectionism Initially started during the boom periods supported by
IS I. He forced businesses, government and private alike, to become more
competitive In the International marketplace. Through the first six
months of 1988, manufacturing exports were up 20 percent over 1987. More
Importantly, through August, 1988, non-oil exports were $9.4 billion,
more than doub le that of oil exports (Anderson, 1988, 0746). These types
of figures show a lessening of the dependence on other countries' foreign
policy for Mexico's well being. Additionally, they will kill an already
sick patronage system based on oil for financing.
Besides diversifying exports, de la Madrid is trying to sell off many
of the government-owned state agencies In an effort to reduce the
Internal debt. Through over-Inflated payrolls and price subsidies, the
regime now supports unprofitable enterprises In an effort to create Jobs.
This selling of businesses to the private sector will have a least
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two positive effects. One, the businesses will have to become profitable
or die. This means competing on the International market with higher
quality products. Two, with business In private hands, it will be harder
for the regime to finance any type of patronage system. In the oil-based
rewards system, Petroleos Mexicanos, or PEMEX, the state-owned oil
company, was the only enterprise the government needed to control to
ensure Its finances. In an economy expanding and diversifying Its
exports, as well as turning industry over to private concerns, government
financing from company profits will be more difficult to obtain.
Mexico's economy is not based on the same tenets as before the
collapse and the incurring of an unmanageable foreign debt. Oil Is no
longer king. A restab i I I zat ion of the economy will not reverse the
process started by the collapse. It will Instead encourage the
democratic opening and provide a stable foundation from which to build.
To help build this foundation, the U.S. must become more involved In
Mexican affairs to attack the problems of the foreign debt, migration,
and drug trafficking.
1 . The Fore Ign Debt
The U.S. must forgive part of Mexico's foreign debt. Simply
lending additional monies as bridging loans will not help Mexico out of
its crisis. The $3.5 billion recently lent to Mexico by the U.S. helps
in the short term but does not address the fact that this third world
country sends more money out of the country than It brings in. Money
needed badly for development is Instead used to pay interest on the debt.
Mexico's loan paper currently sells on the International market for
approximately 55-60 cents on the dollar. U.S. banks should gradually
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write off 45 percent of Mexico's debt and then be more prudent In making
new loans. After the debt forgiveness, the recommendations of the Baker
Plan, specifically the requirement to pay all the Interest on its foreign
I iabi I 1 1 ies, could be real 1st lea I ly imp lemented by Mex Ico without
crippling its development.
Critics say U.S. banks cannot afford to write off loans at that
amount. The fact Is that many of the largest U.S. banks have already
set aside reserves to cover up to 25 percent of the Mexican debt yet
continue to try and collect the full amount. Writing off 45 percent has
already been partially accomplished.
Critics say writing off that much of the debt will be
destabilizing to the United States. The fact is Mexico does not have
now, and will not have In the future, the capability to pay off its $100+
billion foreign debt. It will be more destabilizing if Mexico defaults
completely on loan payments. It will be more destabilizing if Mexican
workers revolt after losing another 50 percent of their buying power. It
will be more destabilizing If our third largest trading partner can no
longer buy American goods.
Critics say Mexico got Itself Into trouble by taking borrowed
money after squandering oil revenues in the late 1970's and now must "pay
the piper." While It Is true Mexico misused its export money, the fact
Is It takes two to make a bad loan, a borrower and a lender. During the
last decade, U.S. banks made many loans with excess petrodollars, many
perhaps unadvisedly, so too did other foreign banks, especially West




Mexico generates 350,000-400,000 Jobs annually In a country where
half of the population of 84 million people Is under the age of 16. Each
year 800,000 to 1 million Jobs are needed Just to maintain the current
unemployment rate. Immigration to the United States has always been a
safety valve for the discontented. Critics cite lost Jobs and
overburdened social services. The fact is Mexican workers take Jobs
American workers do not want. The fact Is cheap Mexican labor often
allows Industries and plants Including textiles and shoes to remain
viable and competitive in the international marketplace. If these
Industries were forced to pay higher wages to U.S. workers, many would
close and many more jobs would be lost overseas. The U.S. needs to
improve its retraining programs for workers displaced by immigrants so
that higher skilled jobs can be found. The U.S. should allow more
Immigration but better document the flow and better plan needed social
services.
This problem is closely tied to that of the foreign debt.
Because debt servicing is so taxing on the country, needed development
cannot take place and therefore needed Jobs cannot be created. Because
needed jobs cannot be developed, workers migrate to El Norte, the United
States. As the United States helps Mexico recover economically, less
workers will migrate, and therefore the Immigration problem for the U.S.
should lessen. Critics say that solving Mexico's problems will not
significantly decrease the Immigration flow from Latin America. The
fact is fully 75 percent of Illegal Immigration to the United States Is
from Mex ico.
-134-
3. Drug Traf f Ick Ing
The U.S. should continue to pressure Mexico to work on the drug
problem while stepping up Its own efforts. These efforts would include
massive drug education programs at the elementary school level, stepped
up efforts of local and state police forces subsidized by federal monies,
and establishment of a national anti-drug czar to coordinate the program
across the country. Critics say these type of programs would cost money
the U.S. does not have to spend. The fact Is lost productivity, sick
days, medical care, and higher Insurance premiums cost much more.
Critics say the problem would go away if Mexico stopped shipping drugs
Into the country. The fact Is drugs come to the U.S. from all over the
world. Mexico is but one of the suppliers. If the demand decreases,
the supply of drugs should decrease accordingly. Countries produce what
Is most In demand. This is not to say efforts should be made only on the
demand side, but the effort from the U.S. side should certainly be
strengthened.
B. FINAL THOUGHTS
The United States, in helping to stabilize Mexico, will see growth in
a grassroots movement toward substantive democracy. This thesis explores
Mexico over the next 20 years but it would also be Interesting to do some
long range "crystal-balling" and explore how far this grassroots movement
will take the country over the next 50 to 100 years. It Is the author's
opinion that Mexico will never be a democracy like the United States.
There will most probably be some form of authoritarian rule at the
national level with democratic principles evident at the lower levels of
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power. It should however be quickly added that Mexico does not have to
duplicate the United States politically to be successful socially,
economically, or In the political arena. Mexico will continue to evolve
and grow over the next century, as will every country. This evolution
should be measured In Latin American terms and not by European, Asian, or
U.S. standards. With the possible exception of Brazil, Mexico shows more
promise for prosperity and growth, within a Latin American context, than
any other country In that region of the world.
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